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Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and
Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face
Execution Requirement
Robert F. Schopp*
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary American criminal law prohibits the execution of
those who are not competent to face execution. The state cannot execute
convicted offenders, including those who have been sentenced to death
for capital crimes under valid law and through acceptable procedures,
unless those offenders are competent at the time of execution. Although
this requirement applies in all states that practice the death penalty and
traces its heritage deep into the common law, its exact formulation
remains controversial as does the appropriate rationale and the corre-
sponding procedure.'
Five identifiable questions have troubled courts and commentators.
First, what rationale justifies this requirement? Second, what is the
appropriate standard of competency to face execution? Third, does the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution preclude execution
of the incompetent as cruel and unusual punishment? Fourth, what
procedural protection is necessary to implement this requirement? Fifth,
what ethical dilemmas does this requirement raise for health care profes-
sionals who participate in the criminal justice system, and how should
these clinicians resolve these issues?
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(3d ed. 1985); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law §. 4.4(c) (1986);
Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L.
Rev. 381 (1962); Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14
Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 35 (1986); Note, Eighth Amendment-The Constitutional Rights of
the Insane on Death Row, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 844 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Eighth Amendment); Note, Ford v. Wainwright: The Eighth Amendment, Due Process,
and Insanity on Death Row, 7 N. Ill. L. Rev. 89 (1987) (hereinafter Note, Ford]; Note,
The Eighth Amendment and the Executipn of the Presently Incompetent, 32 Stan. L.
Rev. 765 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Presently Incompetent]; Note, Insanity of the Con-
demned, 88 Yale L.J. 533 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Condemned].
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The United States Supreme Court addressed some of these issues
in Ford v. Wainwright in which the Court held that the eighth amend-
ment prohibits execution of the "insane." 2 The court in Wainwright
discussed the rationale and standard for this requirement, but it did not
resolve these issues.' The Court also explained its reasons for rejecting
the Florida procedure for implementing the competency to face execution
(CFE) provision of Florida law, but it did not specify appropriate
procedures. 4 In short, the Court granted eighth amendment status to
the CFE requirement, and it identified shortcomings in the Florida
procedures, but the appropriate rationale, standard, and procedures re-
main unclear.
Although the CFE requirement has not produced voluminous lit-
erature, several commentators from the legal profession and other con-
cerned disciplines have discussed the identified issues. Legal commentators
have most frequently concentrated on the procedural protection due,
although they have also discussed the rationale, standard and consti-
tutional implications.' Mental health professionals have more often con-
centrated on the resulting ethical dilemmas encountered by members of
their professions.6
While courts and commentators have discussed the rationale thought
to justify the CFE requirement, these analyses have not provided sat-
isfactory rationales or corresponding standards. This paper examines the
justifications that have been suggested and argues that none of the
2. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); see generally, Ward,
supra note 1; Note, Eighth Amendment, supra note 1; Note, Ford, supra note 1; Note,
Presently Incompetent, supra note 1. Various courts and commentators have described
offenders who become severely disturbed between sentencing and execution as either
"insane" or "incompetent." Both of these terms engender confusion because they seem
to suggest that the issue and appropriate standard are analogous to the insanity defense
or competence to stand trial. In order to avoid conflating various issues, this paper will
use the term "disturbed offender" to refer to those condemned offenders who become
sufficiently psychopathological to render them inappropriate for execution by the as yet
unspecified standard of competency to face execution. The term will not refer to all
offenders who suffer any psychological disturbance. Rather, it identifies only those whose
pathology is so severe as to preclude execution according to the applicable standard.
3. Justice Powell did advance both a rationale and a standard in his concurring
opinion. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 418-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2606-08.
4. Wainwright, 399 U.S. at 413-16, 106 S. Ct. 2603-05.
5. See generally, Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1; Ward, supra note 1; Note, Ford,
supra note 1; Note, Presently Incompetent, supra note 1; Note, Condemned, supra note
1.
6. See, e.g., Miller, Evaluation of and Treatment to Competency to be Executed:
A National Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. of Psychiatry & L. 67 (1988); Radelet &
Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to Be Executed, 14
The Bull. of the Am. Acad. of Psychiatry and the L. 37 (1986); Comment, Performing
"Competency to be Executed" Evaluations: A Psycholegal Analysis for Preventing the
Execution of the Insane, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 718 (1988).
[Vol. 51
COMPETENCY TO FACE EXECUTION
familiar candidates withstand scrutiny. It then advances two alternatives
and contends that these rationales provide a more satisfactory foundation
for the CFE requirement and, further, that this analysis demonstrates
that the CFE requirement addresses a fundamentally different type of
issue than it is usually presented as raising. Finally, this analysis illu-
minates broader jurisprudential issues regarding the nature and justifi-
cation of legal punishment, including the role of retributive principles
in the social institution of punishment and the nature of the moral
condemnation expressed by legal conviction and punishment.
The CFE issue does not arise unless three conditions are met. 7 First,
one must assume that the state may justifiably execute some defendants
under some conditions.' Second, in order to avoid conflating the question
with several other issues involving psychological dysfunction, one must
assume that the offenders in question were competent to proceed when
they were tried and sentenced, that they did not meet the requirements
of the insanity defense, and that they suffered no mental disorder that
rendered the death sentence inappropriate by mitigating their culpability.
Finally, these defendants must suffer some serious mental dysfunction
at the time of scheduled execution, although the nature of that disorder
must remain unspecified until the appropriate CFE standard is formu-
lated later in the paper.
The argument will proceed in the following manner. Section II
reviews and rejects the usual rationales for the CFE requirement. Section
III advances a positive consequentialist justification for the CFE pro-
vision. 9 Section IV articulates an interpretation of the retributive theory
of punishment that differs from those which are usually discussed in
the CFE literature, while explicating the nature of the moral condem-
nation inherently expressed by legal punishment. 0 Section V interprets
7. These conditions are logically prior in that the CFE question could not arise, in
principle, unless these conditions obtained. In practice, a defense attorney might raise the
CFE issue despite his belief that one or more of them had been decided wrongly.
8. Many people would dispute this claim, arguing that capital punishment is never
justified. If one holds that the state can never legitimately execute anyone, then it follows
that the state cannot justifiably execute an offender who suffers severe mental disorder.
Hence, one must assume for the sake of argument that the state can justifiably execute
some offenders in order to render the CFE dispute substantive.
9. A consequentialist justification is one that purports to justify an action or rule
by appealing only to the consequences it is expected to produce. In moral theory generally,
such theories may also be categorized as teleological theories, and Utilitarianism is one
well-known theory of this type. W. Frankena, Ethics 14-17 (2d ed. 1973). The central
debate regarding the justification of punishment is often framed as one comparing tele-
ological or utilitarian accounts to retributive ones. See, e.g., G. Ezorsky, Philosophical
Perspectives on Punishment 37-181 (1972); H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 1-27
(1968).
10. For an account of retributive approaches to punishment, see H. Hart, supra note
9 or G. Ezorsky, supra note 9.
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the CFE requirement in light of sections III and IV and proposes a
revised standard. Finally, section VI summarizes the argument.
II. TIE STANDARD RATIONALES
Courts and commentators have identified a series of putative ra-
tionales for the CFE requirement, although few of these writers have
concluded that any of these proposals provide fully satisfactory foun-
dations. At least one source has suggested each of the following jus-
tifications. Some have argued that it offends Christian charity to execute
offenders who cannot prepare to meet their maker. Others portray the
CFE provision as an extension of the more general requirement that
courts try only defendants who are competent to participate in their
own defense. According to this view, the CFE provision prevents exe-
cution of offenders who lack the capacity to raise facts or arguments
that might legitimately preclude their execution. Some contend that
execution of disturbed offenders would not serve the deterrent or re-
tributive purposes of capital punishment, while others argue that severe
mental disorder itself constitutes sufficient punishment, thus rendering
execution excessive. Others have argued that executing disturbed offen-
ders constitutes an unnecessary taking of human life, or that the CFE
provision actually represents a subtle method of limiting the generally
questionable practice of capital punishment.
A. The Opportunity to Prepare for Death
Consider first the claim that it would offend Christian charity to
execute prisoners who lacked the capacity to prepare to meet their
maker." This rationale is difficult to reconcile with the principle of
neutrality toward religion that the first amendment of the Constitution
is usually understood to mandate. 2 Some have argued that it also
misconstrues the nature of the Christian conception of judgment in that
the traditional christian view would lead one to expect God to evaluate
the individual's moral status on the basis of an entire life, rather than
only on the point of execution. 3 In addition, the contention that human
executioners must restrict executions to those who are "capable of
preparing to meet their maker" is based on an internally inconsistent
premise. This argument elevates religious faith to a status of such high
regard that deference to that faith justifies overriding a legal execution
pursuant to valid law, while it also suggests that humanity must exercise
11. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2600 (1986); Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 18, 70 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1, at 387; Ward, supra note 1, at 50-51.
12. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1188-1201 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe provides
an analysis of neutrality in the context of the first amendment and religion.
13. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1, at 388; Ward, supra note 1, at 51.
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mercy because God cannot be trusted to do so. This view elevates one
particular religious tradition to a privileged status, while it implicitly
questions the omnibenevolence traditionally attributed to the God on
which that religious tradition is based.
Justice Powell presented a secular variation of this rationale in his
concurring opinion in Wainwright. He argued that most men and women
value the opportunity to prepare for their deaths and that it would be
cruel to execute a person who lacked the understanding needed to do
So. 14 This interpretation of the argument has the virtue of removing the
controversial appeal to certain religious beliefs and recasting it in terms
of humane consideration and charity. The weakness of this rationale is,
however, that some people fear death sufficiently to hope fervently that
they die in their sleep with no warning or opportunity to prepare at
all. These individuals might welcome the opportunity to face execution
through clouded comprehension rather than with full understanding of
their plight.
More fundamentally, why would the legal system grant such special
weight to this particular set of the condemned person's values and
preferences? Presumably, many of these condemned offenders also value
their lives and freedom, but the law does not cater to these preferences
by commuting their death sentences or releasing them from prison. It
remains a mystery why it would be more cruel to frustrate their pre-
ferences for an opportunity to prepare to face their deaths than it is
to frustrate their preferences for continued life.
Another secular variation of the "prepare to meet your maker"
argument insists that the possibility of repentance is a morally good
state of affairs. According to this rationale, the state should not execute
disturbed offenders because they lack the capacity to repent. Their
execution would preclude the possibility of their repenting at the time
of their executions. Even if one accepts the contention that a world
where criminals have repented is morally superior to one where they
have not, this argument does not support a general CFE requirement.
Rather, this contention would merely support a stay of execution for
disturbed offenders who had not already repented. This rationale pro-
vides no reason to refrain from executing disturbed offenders who have
repented during the period between their crimes and their scheduled
executions.
B. CFE as an Extension of Competency to Stand Trial
This rationale, like the previous one, has roots deep in the common
law. 5 Unlike the previous argument, however, it does not cast the CFE
14. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 2607 (Powell, J., concurring).
15. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 407, 106 S. Ct. at 2600; Solesbee v. Balkcom, 399 U.S.
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provision as one that postpones justified executions out of charity.
Rather, it endorses the requirement as a final attempt to avoid unjustified
executions. On this interpretation, the CFE requirement serves as a final
filter in the procedure of capital punishment by assuring that convicted
persons will not die only because they lack the ability to raise exculpatory
or mitigating arguments.
While this rationale may have carried considerable weight during
earlier periods, contemporary procedures render it obsolete. Factual issues
are contested primarily at the trial court level where the defendant's
opportunity to participate and advise the difense attorney is protected
by the requirement that trials proceed only when the defendant is com-
petent to understand and assist. In addition, an extensive state and
federal review process and the right to counsel at mandatory appeals
assures effective review of death sentences. 6 Finally, appeals that occur
late in the sequence of events leading to execution tend to address legal
rather than factual issues, emphasizing the competence of the attorney
rather than that of the condemned prisoner. 17
C. Execution and the Deterrent Purpose of Punishment
This argument can take either strong or moderate forms. The mod-
erate form contends that executing incompetent offenders is not necessary
to the deterrent function of punishment: others will perceive the dif-
ference between "disturbed offenders" and themselves, and competent
individuals will realize that they would be executed although the disturbed
offender was not. Furthermore, because no one can plan to become
mentally disabled if they are sentenced to death, they cannot plan on
taking advantage of this CFE exception if it is maintained. s Thus,
sparing disturbed offenders from execution will not undermine the de-
terrent function of capital punishment.
9, 18, 70 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Hazard & Louisell, supra
note 1, at 383-84; Ward, supra note 1, at 50.
16. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 420, 106 S. Ct. at 2607 (Powell, J., concurring). Douglas
v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963) (extending the right
to counsel to an appeal the defendant has of right).
17. See e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (holding that the eighth
amendment does not categorically preclude the death penalty for mentally retarded of-
fenders); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987) (finding that the eighth
amendment does not prohibit the death penalty for defendants who did not personally
inflict the fatal wound to the victim but who participated in a felony with reckless
indifference to human life); Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (holding that the
eighth amendment precludes execution of disturbed offenders); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972) (striking down death penalty statute that is discretionary
on its face but discriminatory in practice).
18. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1, at 384-85.
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The strong version of the argument contends not only that execution
of the disturbed offender is unnecessary to the deterrent function but
also that these executions cannot serve the deterrent purpose. Under this
interpretation, execution of incompetent offenders would be so cruel
and inhumane that it would not serve as an example to others. 19
Others argue that if the purpose of punishment is to frighten others
into complying with the law, then a demonstration that no offender
will escape punishment will likely further that purpose.2 Although some
question the deterrent value of legal punishment in general and of capital
punishment in particular, punishment deters more effectively when it is
certain; eliminating exceptions increases certainty.2' It is at least rea-
sonable to expect, therefore, that capital punishment would deter more
effectively without, rather than with, the CFE provision.
In addition, the moderate form of this rationale contemplates an
unrealistically refined pattern of reflection by those who might be af-
fected by the deterrent function of the death penalty. If anyone refrains
from homicide to avoid execution, it seems improbable that they carefully
peruse legal journals to determine the exact conditions under which
offenders are executed. Presumably, anyone who is deterred from com-
mitting homicide by fear of the death penalty responds with a relatively
gross impression such as "they hang you for that." While fine dis-
tinctions regarding the appropriate scope of capital punishment may be
very important to the moral foundations of the criminal law, it is unlikely
that potential offenders who might be deterred from committing crimes
as serious as homicide respond with such a refined analysis.
D. Unnecessary Taking of Human Life
In its early form this position consisted of the claim that madness
constitutes sufficient punishment in itself, thus rendering execution un-
19. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 407, 106 S. Ct. at 2600; Solesbee v. Balkcom, 399 U.S.
9, 17, 170 S. Ct. 457, 461 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Ward, supra note 1, at
51. It is not entirely clear whether this view contends that executing the disturbed offender
would actively undermine the deterrent function, or only that it cannot advance that
purpose.
20. Ward, supra note 1, at 51-52.
21. A. Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action 268, 278 (1986); G.
Walters & J. Grusec, Punishment 71-74 (1977). Experimental research consistently dem-
onstrates that punishment suppresses behavior more effectively when every incident of the
behavior elicits punishment. Conditions in the criminal justice system differ from those
in experimental research, and thus, one must extrapolate from this research to criminal
punishment. To the extent that this research supports the contention that punishment
deters more effectively when it is perceived as likely to follow every incident of the
forbidden conduct, however, it suggests that any exception to the death penalty will dilute
any preventive effect that capital punishment might have.
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necessary and excessive? 2 Commentators have rejected this argument
because incompetence only postpones execution until the offender re-
covers. These commentators reason that if madness constitutes sufficient
punishment, incompetent offenders would have their sentences commuted
and would be released upon recovering their mental capabilities. 2s On
the other hand one could argue that madness constitutes punishment
comparable to the death penalty only when it, like death, is permanent.
Thus, only permanent mental disorder is an adequate substitute for
execution. Temporary madness would not preclude the defendant's ex-
ecution upon recovery.
Three additional reasons exist that undermine this rationale. First,
the claim that madness is comparable to death is simply false. While
it may be true that some severely disordered people suffer great distress,
such suffering cannot be tantamount to death. Whatever form it may
take, mental disorder constitutes a mode of experience, not a complete
lack of experience, and most people who suffer from psychopathology
retain at least the possibility of future improvement, while those who
are executed do not. Second, severe mental disorder does not necessarily
entail extreme distress nor is it necessarily limited to such distress without
any positive experiences. The description in Wainright of Ford's con-
dition on death row, for example, includes agitation regarding delusional
events that concerned him, but it also suggests a measure of comfort
and confidence in his delusional court victories and status. 24
Finally, madness cannot constitute punishment comparable to exe-
cution simply because it is not punishment at all. Punishment consists
of some form of harsh treatment by an authority toward an offender
for an offense. 2 Although mental disorder may involve great distress,
it is not punishment because it is not imposed by an authority on an
offender for an offense. A fortiori, a condition that does not constitute
punishment cannot constitute punishment comparable to death.
The contemporary claim, that incompetency should preclude execution
because executing incompetent offenders involves ,taking human life un-
necessarily does not depend on this misguided equivalence of suffering
and punishment. It does, however, employ as a premise the proposition
that such executions are not needed to maintain the deterrent function
of punishment. 26 For the reasons stated above, however, it is plausible
that if the death penalty deters at all, then it will do so more effectively
22. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1, at 384; Ward, supra note 1, at 50.
23. Id.
24. Ford v. Wainwright, 447 U.S. 399, 402-03, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2597-98 (1986).
25. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-16, 80 S. Ct. 1367, 1373-76 (1960)
(punishment occurs only when the legislature directs sanctions at the person or persons
affected); J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving 95 (1970); H. Hart, supra note 9, at 4-5.
26. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1, at 386.
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without the exception for those who are incompetent to face execution. 2
If this contention is accurate, then exempting disturbed offenders from
execution would impair the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
One might, however, respond that a plausible argument favoring
removing the CFE requirement is not sufficient to support doing so. In
order to support the taking of human lives, advocates must prove that
these additional executions are necessary to effectuate the deterrent pur-
pose of capital punishment. A merely plausible argument leaves too
much room for error to justify rescinding a historical provision that
protects people from death.
As an argument in support of the CFE requirement, however, this
reasoning proves too much. Recall the three initial assumptions made
in the introduction. CFE becomes a substantive issue only if one accepts
for the sake of argument the proposition that the state can justifiably
maintain an institution of capital punishment and apply it to some
offenders. If the justified taking of human life requires proof that it
is necessary for deterrence, however, then this initial assumption fails.
The claim that justified taking of human life requires something near
certainty that it will serve an overriding purpose may well constitute a
powerful argument regarding capital punishment, but it addresses the
general institution, not the CFE requirement specifically.
In addition to proving too much, this argument from the unnecessary
taking of human life fails to prove enough. Assuming that one could
establish that executing the severely disturbed is actually unnecessary to
the deterrent effect of capital punishment, this argument fails to provide.
sufficient foundation for the moral intuitions and mandate involved.
Courts and commentators have denounced the execution of the insane
as "cruel" and "brutal."12 Indeed, the Wainright Court concluded that
the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bars
execution of the insane as "the barbarity of exacting mindless ven-
geance." 29 These judgments and the moral intuitions they reveal extend
well beyond the claim that these executions are not necessary. The claim,
rather, is that execution of the insane is morally repugnant and, thus,
unjustifiable even if the practice promotes legitimate social purposes.
An adequate rationale for such a conclusion must support the contention
that executing the insane is morally condemned regardless of how useful
it might be, not merely that it is unnecessary for social purposes.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
28. See e.g., Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 2607 (Powell, J., concurring);
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20, 70 S. Ct. 457, 462 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 410, 106 S. Ct. at 2602.
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It is important here to remember the distinction between the purpose
of legal punishment and its justification.30 Society maintains an institution
of criminal punishment at least partially for the purpose of guiding
conduct in such a manner as to prevent crimes, and a legitimate social
goal provides some justification for a practice that will promote it. A
legitimate social purpose, however, does not justify every act that serves
to promote the purpose.
Punishing the innocent might promote deterrence in some cases, for
example, but this benefit does not justify punishing the innocent. Al-
though some might argue that extreme circumstances could justify some
instances of punishing the innocent, a mere incremental improvement
in some legitimate social goal would not justify such a practice. Many
other social purposes and moral principles limit the extent and manner
in which society can justifiably promote any particular legitimate social
goal.3' Constitutional procedural protection, for example, limits the meth-
ods that the government can employ in pursuing the legitimate preventive
and prosecutorial purposes of the criminal justice system. 32
Commentators have argued persuasively that individual guilt and
desert are necessary to justify the use of punishment as a method of
pursuing the legitimate social goal of crime prevention. 3  If the long-
standing CFE requirement represents moral repugnance at the prospect
of executing disturbed., offenders, then executing these prisoners, like
punishing the innocent, violates the moral foundations of the criminal
law, at least insofar as these moral principles have traditionally been
understood. An adequate justification of the CFE requirement must
demonstrate not merely that executing these people would not serve
social purposes, but that such executions would be unjustifiable even if
they would promote social goals.
E. Tacit Clemency
One commentator has advanced a rationale for the CFE requirement
that construes this provision as a method of addressing societal ambiv-
alence toward the death penalty by providing "tacit clemency." This
interpretation suggests that although society endorses capital punishment,
it remains ambivalent about the justification of it and attempts to
ameliorate its impact by reducing the frequency of application through
a variety of limiting and qualifying provisions including the CFE re-
quirement. 34
30. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 3-13; A. Ross, On Guilt, Responsibility, and Punishment
43-66 (1975).
31. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 10.
32. W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 1.6 (1984).
33. H. Hart, supra note 9; A. Ross, supra note 30, at 1-98.
34. Ward, supra note 1, at 56.
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This account provides an explanation for the CFE requirement. It
fails, however, to justify it. Reasons can justify a human act or decision
by grounding it in moral principles, or they can explain those acts or
decisions by appeal to desires, beliefs, expectations or psychological and
sociological theories. Thus, justifying reasons justify and explanatory
reasons explain, but neither can substitute for the other because they
appeal to different types of underlying principles. To support an ac-
ceptable standard for the CFE requirement, a rationale must justify the
CFE provision as part of the larger social institution of legal punishment.
That is, it must explain why society ought not execute certain disturbed
offenders, not why it does not, because the standard must separate
those who society can justifiably execute from those whose society cannot
justifiably execute. Thus, the explication of the CFE requirement as
tacit clemency produced by social ambivalence may explain the practice,
but it is simply the wrong type of rationale to provide justification.
F. Execution and the Retributive Purpose of Punishment
The Supreme Court has identified deterrence and retribution as the
two primary social purposes of capital punishment.35 One rationale for
the CFE requirement relies on the contention that executing the insane
cannot serve the retributive purpose. Justice Powell, for example, con-
tends that execution of the disturbed offender fails to promote the
retributive purpose of capital punishment because retribution requires
awareness.3 6 Evaluating this position requires clarifying the concept of
retribution because sources employ different interpretations of retribution
in discussing capital punishment. Some sources advance retribution as
a moral balance in which each crime elicits punishment that is in some
sense equal to the offense, thus balancing the moral scales. Those who
justify the CFE requirement by appeal to this form of retribution argue
that executing insane offenders will not restore the moral balance because
the harm or suffering produced in the severely disturbed offender will
not be comparable to that which the offender caused in the presumably
intact victim.3 7
Moral theorists who have studied the theory of punishment have
rejected the moral balance version of retribution as the "fiercest form
of retributivism"38 and as "incoherent." 3 9 The conceptual quagmire in-
35. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929-30 (1976).
36. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 421, 1106 S. Ct. 2595, 2607-08 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring).
37. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 1, at 386-87; Ward, supra note 1, at 54-56; Note,
Condemned, supra note 1, at 536.
38. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 236.
39. J. Feinberg, supra note 25, at 116-17.
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herent in this interpretation of the retributive principle as requiring a
"moral balance" becomes apparent when one attempts to specify the
nature of the variables to be balanced and the method of comparing
them. If the punishment must qualitatively and quantitatively match the
crime, then this theory becomes impossible to apply because the official
performing the punishment lacks any method for comparing incom-
mensurate evils. Does the principle require, for example, that the state
torture torturers? Must the state execute multiple killers several times?
This theory would preclude punishment of those who committed crimes
for which no comparable punishment was possible. How, for example,
could the state punish the vandal who destroys a work of art but has
never created one that could be destroyed in return? Would incarceration
never be a justified punishment except for crimes of false imprisonment?
Would this principle forbid the execution not only of insane killers,
but also of killers like Gilmore who reject appeal of their executions
because they have decided that they would rather die than continue life
on death row?40 Arguably, execution of such killers would fail to establish
the proper moral- balance because these offenders have decided that they
prefer death to continued life, while their victims probably had not
made a comparable decision. This rationale suggests a legal "catch 22"
in that a condemned offender can waive the right to challenge the death
sentence only if that decision is made "knowingly and intelligently, ' 4'
but if the decision met those criteria, death would apparently be a relief
rather than a terrifying prospect so it would not meet the moral balance
test. Thus, if an offender competently waived her right to challenge her
execution, death would not be an appropriate punishment for her.
These and other problems with the moral balance concept of pun-
ishment have led some writers to interpret retribution as calling for the
satisfaction of the society's thirst for vengeance. Using this interpretation,
retributive punishment does not seek a moral balance; rather, it prescribes
punishment sufficient to satisfy the public anger and demand for re-
venge.42
This interpretation of the retributive function of punishment, like
the moral balance one, encounters serious conceptual difficulties. First,
40. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S. Ct. 436 (1976).
41. Id. at 1013, 97 S. Ct. at 437 (concluding that Gilmore validly waived his right
to challenge the death penalty).
42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96.S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976); J. Stephen,
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 149 (1873); Ward, supra note i, at 54-57. In many cases,
it is impossible to determine with great confidence what the courts or commentators mean
by "retributive" because they do not clarify the concept as they use it. The works cited
for each variation are those which at least arguably contemplate the interpretation discussed.
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it is not clear that this interpretation is retributive in any traditional
sense of the word. Immanuel Kant, who is most often regarded as the
classic proponent of the retributive theory of punishment, required death
for homicide but specifically rejected punishment involving "any mal-
treatment that would make an abomination of the humanity residing in
the person suffering it." 43 Kant portrayed punishment as necessary to
vindicate rights, but he rejected as revengeful and vicious punishment
beyond what is required to defend rights." Kant contended that society
has a moral obligation to punish in proportion to the wrong done, but
he specifically forbade cruelty and indulgence in vengeful motives. The
correct explication of Kantian retributivism remains controversial, but
it does not license indulgence of a social thirst for vengeance.
Putting aside its claim to the retributive heritage, this rationale is
both too narrow and too wide to provide a satisfactory rationale for
the CFE requirement. It is too wide in that it seems that it should
apply also to the Gilmore-type cases in which the defendant has decided
that he would rather die than continue on death row and, therefore,
that he would find death a relief rather than a curse. Presumably,
bringing relief to a condemned offender is not a technique likely to
quench the thirst for vengeance. It is too narrow in that it would cover
only a subset of disturbed offenders. There is no reason to think that
all severely disturbed persons would suffer less from execution than
psychologically intact ones would. Suppose, for example, that a psychotic
offender with religious delusions believed that he was being killed by
the devil in a special ritual to insure that he would burn in hell forever.
Such a psychotic defendant might actually experience greater distress
than an intact defendant who believed he had made peace with God
and his death. Thus, executing this particular disturbed defendant should
adequately quench the social thirst for vengeance.
Ironically, this rationale appears to conflict with another theory
sometimes advanced in support of the CFE requirement. Under this
theory, a legal system that refuses to execute disturbed offenders because
they are unable to come to terms with their execution but allows the
execution of intact offenders who have come to terms with their fate
will allow the execution of those whose reconciliation with their situation
minimizes their distress. Thus, such a system prevents full exercise of
society's need for vengeance.
Finally, and most importantly, the public vengeance variation of
"retribution" creates a perversion of the exception. Traditionally, courts
and commentators have condemned execution of disturbed offenders as
barbaric, cruel, or brutal, but on this interpretation, such executions
43. I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 333 (1797) (J. Ladd trans. 102
(1965)).
44. I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics 214 (L. Infield trans. 1930).
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are rejected as insufficiently brutal to satisfy the thirst for vengeance.
This account rejects execution of the insane not as unjustified but rather
as inadequate satisfaction of the public preference for revenge. Thus,
this rationale arguably serves to prescribe torture rather than to proscribe
execution.4
5
The most plausible interpretation of the retributive rationale ad-
vanced by courts and commentators is the requirement of proportionate
punishment. This principle requires punishment in relative proportion to
the offender's guilt. For example, murder must be punished more severely
than assault, intentional homicide more severely than negligent homicide,
and unprovoked assault more severely than provoked assault.4
Although plausible and amenable to practical application, this re-
tributive principle does not directly address CFE. This principle is a
backward-looking one in the sense that it prescribes the appropriate
degree of punishment by looking back to the offender's guilt at the
time of the offense. If the offender performed the offense under con-
ditions appropriate to support the death sentence, psychopathology at
the time of execution does not alter the degree of guilt attributed to
the actions performed while sane. Thus, capital punishment remains
proportionate to the defendant's guilt at the time the crime was com-
mitted.
G. Summary
The prohibition against executing those who lack competency to face
execution arises from roots deep in the common law and retains broad
consensus in contemporary American criminal law. This virtually uni-
versal agreement among authorities and the emphatic support found in
the most recent Supreme Court opinion 47 suggest that this legal provision
reflects widely and deeply held moral convictions. While some of the
proffered rationales seem to carry some weight under certain conditions,
45. A defender of this vengeance-based interpretation might respond to these criticisms
by claiming that this position only advocates the degree of vengeance that this particular
offense justifies, not any degree that society happens to feel toward the offender. In this
case, however, vengeance serves as a measure of 'just punishment only insofar as it
corresponds to desert, and the vengeance theory collapses into the form of retributivism
that calls for punishment in proportion to guilt and desert. This interpretation is addressed
next.
46. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1987); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976); J. Feinberg, supri note 25, at
70, 118; H. Hart, supra note 9, at 24-25. Tison and Gregg arguably endorse this variation
of retributivism, although neither clarifies the concept well enough to allow certainty.
47. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) (both the majority
and the concurring opinion by Justice Powell emphatically endorsed the requirement).
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none provide a fully satisfactory and coherent principled foundation for
this well-established legal rule that categorically prohibits execution of
disturbed offenders.
This lack of a satisfactory justification for the rule is troubling from
both a theoretical and practical perspectives. Theoretically, the lack of
a clear justification obscures the relationship between this provision and
the larger body of criminal law, making it difficult to evaluate the
consistency between this rule and any other aspect of the broader system
or to draw inferences about the significance of the CFE provision for
other issues. Practically, the lack of a clear justification has resulted in
a corresponding failure to develop a satisfactory standard of competence
and ongoing questions about the appropriate procedures. The next two
sections of this paper advance principled foundations for the CFE re-
quirement and examine the significance of these for broader issues in
the jurisprudence of punishment.
III. POSITVE JUSTIFICATION: CONSEQUENTIAUST
A. Clarification of Deterrence
The Supreme Court has identified deterrence and retribution as the
two primary social purposes of capital punishment. 4 Society maintains
a criminal justice system, at least partially, to guide behavior within
socially acceptable limits. In doing so, the system employs legal pun-
ishment to deter the offender and others from committing crimes. Al-
though some may debate its effectiveness, deterrence remains one of
the system's primary strategies for guiding behavior.
The term "deter" carries both strict and extended interpretations in
the debate regarding legal punishment, and establishing the appropriate
role of deterrence in the CFE issue requires clarification of the term as
applied to this dispute. In the strict sense, to deter is "[tlo discourage
or stop by fear." 49 In this strict sense, punishment deters when it
dissuades a person from committing an offense through fear of the
consequences. It does so specifically when it reduces the propensity to
repeat the crime of the person punished by instilling fear of further
punishment in that person. It deters generally when it discourages others
from committing crimes by serving as an example of unpleasant con-
sequences that they can expect to encounter if they violate the law.50
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S. Ct. at 2929-30.
49. Black's Law Dictionary 405 (5th ed. 1979). The Oxford English Dictionary (com-
pact ed. 1977) provides a similar central sense of the term.
50. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 128; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 1.5(a).
Terms vary somewhat across writers. For example, specific deterrence may be called
individual or particular deterrence.
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In the extended sense, deterrence may alter a potential actor's mo-
tivation to act through some mechanism other than fear. In this sense,
to deter is "[t]o stop or prevent from acting or proceeding by danger,
difficulty, or other consideration which disheartens or counterveils the
motive to act.''S Deterrence in this sense includes any source or type
of motivation that dissuades the actor from performing some particular
act or type of act. Rational or moral persuasion, for example, might
counterveil a person's motivation to act by providing reason to believe
that the act would be counterproductive or immoral. Such persuasion
would qualify as deterrence in this extended sense although not in the
strict sense which emphasizes the central role of fear.
When used in this extended sense "deterrence" can encompass pun-
ishments designed to decrease the probability of offenses through means
other than fear of consequences. Some theories of punishment, for
example, contend that punishment can prevent crimes through reform,
rehabilitation or incapacitation. 2 Punishment reforms insofar as it leads
the person punished to appreciate the wrongfulness of the punished
conduct, repent for having done wrong, and, thus, to become a better
person and to resolve to avoid wrongful behavior in the future. It
rehabilitates by providing offenders with social or occupational skills
that enable them to function more effectively in society without com-
mitting crimes. Finally, punishment reduces crime through incapacitation
when it deprives the offender of the ability or opportunity to commit
offenses. Incarceration, for example, deprives the offender of most
opportunities to commit crimes during the actual period of confinement.
If one restricts the term "deter" to the strict sense, and uses "preven-
tion" for the extended sense, then deterrence is one of several preventive
strategies, and reform, rehabilitation, and incapacitation are preventive
but not deterrent functions of punishment.5 3
Certain forms of prevention, if effective, including reform and re-
habilitation, provide two types of social benefits. First, they would
decrease the frequency of crime, and second, they would improve the
moral quality or social adaptivity of the person punished. While many
51. Black's Law Dictionary 405 (5th ed. 1979). The Oxford English Dictionary, Id.,
does not provide any comparable definition of "deter" in this broad sense that does not
require motivation through fear.
52. See generally, G. Ezorsky, supra note 9; T. Honderich, Punishment, The Supposed
Justifications (1969); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 1.5; E. Pincoffs, The
Rationale of Legal Punishment (1966). Each of these sources reviews various proposed
justifications for legal punishment. The precise use of terms varies across writers.
53. This paper will use these two terms in this way. Notice that on this convention,
"prevent" actually takes a wider scope than the broad sense of "deter" because it includes
certain modes of prevention, including incapacitation, that do not act through the mo-
tivational system, but by restricting opportunity.
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might doubt the ability of the criminal justice system to produce reform
or rehabilitation, presumably, most people would agree that improved
moral or social functioning would constitute positive effects if the system
could produce them,
Other forms of prevention, in contrast, provide no positive social
benefit independent of their preventive effect. Incapacitation and deter-
rence, for example, fall into this category. If punishment deters effec-
tively, it prevents crime through fear of consequences. Fear of
consequences, unlike reform or rehabilitation, carries no apparent social
value independent of the preventive effect. The social value of deterrence,
therefore, rests entirely on its role as a method of prevention. 4 That
is, if deterrence is a primary social purpose cof punishment, and the
value of deterrence rests entirely in prevention, then prevention must
constitute a primary social purpose of punishment.
If the social value of the deterrent effect of punishment lies in its
preventive function, however, then the deterrent effect of punishment
serves its purpose only if two conditions are met. First, the punishment
must effectively deter some offenses through either the specific or the
general deterrent effect. It may do so independently or in combination
with other factors. Second, the punishment must not promote crime or
impair other preventive functions to a degree that outweighs the deterrent
effect. Since the underlying social purpose is prevention, deterrent pun-
ishment that fails to meet the first condition serves no positive preventive
purpose at all, while punishment that fails to satisfy the second condition
produces a negative net effect in the underlying program of crime
prevention."
B. Two Modes of Offense Prevention by the Criminal Law
Discussions of the preventive functions of the criminal law most
often involve concepts such as deterrence and incapacitation that address
the immediate relationship between a specific instance of punishment
and repetitions of similar offenses by the same offender or by others
in similar conditions. Historically, however, theories addressing the pre-
ventive effect of the criminal law have contemplated two different cat-
egories of preventive effects. 6 Direct preventive effects include deterrence,
54. Section IV will qualify this claim by discussing an additional social value promoted
by deterrence. That argument does not affect this one, however, because. this section
addresses only consequentialist justifications for the CFE requirement, while section IV
examines nonconsequentialist concerns.
55. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will not address other possible social costs
of punishment such as financial costs, limitation of legitimate liberty, etc.
56. See e.g., J. Stephen, supra note 42, at 151-52. H. Hart discusses Stephen's claims
in H. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 60-69 (1963).
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incapacitation, and others that address the relationship described above
between identifiable actors and particular offenses or types of offenses.
When it functions effectively, however, the criminal law also serves to
prevent crime indirectly by articulating and promoting the conventional
social morality. 7 To the extent that the criminal law reflects widely
accepted moral principles within society, it is expected to institutionalize
those widely accepted mores, promoting attitudes and values that are
consistent with both the criminal law and the conventional social mo-
rality. Ideally, this correspondence enhances the morally persuasive force
of the criminal law and promotes the majority's voluntary compliance
with the behavioral guidelines that are common to the criminal law and
the conventional social morality.
While modern criminal codes in large complex societies may prohibit
or require some conduct for reasons of efficiency or administrative
convenience, the core rules of the criminal law usually address offenses
such as murder, theft, or assault. These crimes violate not only the law,
but also conventional moral standards that most members of the society
endorse."8
H.L.A. Hart identifies legal rules which create duties and obligations,
including those which define criminal offenses, as primary rules of
obligation. He contends that in most settled societies the majority of
the people will accept these primary rules from the internal point of
view; that is, they will accept these rules, including the core rules of
the criminal law, as providing reasons for acting in compliance with
those directives. 9 Under these conditions, most people will comply with
the criminal law voluntarily. The criminal law in such a society will
serve primarily as a source of guidelines for self-regulation by the
majority and only secondarily as a coercive enforcement mechanism.
Hart contends that voluntary acceptance by the majority makes coercive
enforcement of the minority possible. 6°
In summary, this view contends that the core rules of the criminal
law represent standards of the society's conventional morality. Most
57. The conventional social morality consists of the moral rules and principles re-
garding social life that are widely accepted in a particular society. Critical morality, in
contrast, consists of that set of moral rules and principles that are best supported by
reasoned argument. In a corrupt society, the conventional morality might be abhorrent
from the viewpoint of critical morality. See, J. Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 124-25
(1988).
58. H. Morris, On Guilt and Innocence 33 (1976).
59. H. Hart, The Concept of Law 86-88, 165 (1961).
60. Id. at 38-39, 193-98. It is not obvious that Hart is correct when he contends
that voluntary compliance by the majority is necessary to make law effective in any
society. Totalitarian societies that are prepared to exercise rapid and unconstrained force
may well be able to coerce most of the population. His claim is at least plausible, however,
if it is limited to liberal societies that place significant restraints on government action.
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members of the society accept these rules as providing good reasons for
compliance with them, and this broad voluntary support enables the
criminal justice system to enforce them against violation by the minority.
On this view, the criminal justice system prevents offenses by a minority
directly through deterrence or incapacitation, while it prevents offenses
by the majority indirectly by articulating and reinforcing the conventional
social morality that this majority uses for voluntary self-direction.
Some empirical research supports this contention that law directs
behavior more effectively through voluntary allegiance and endorsement
than through coercive enforcement. Albert Bandura identifies three major
sources of deterrents for criminal conduct. First, the formal legal con-
viction and punishment deters some potential offenders. Second, informal
social sanctions, involving the social criticism, stigma, and loss of status
that the offender can experience in communities that endorse the criminal
law as representative of acceptable social behavior, discourage those who
are sensitive to these forms of rejection from committing offenses.
Finally, self-sanctions consist of self-criticism and self-condemnation by
the individual who accepts the moral standards represented by the crim-
inal law, and these self-generated motivators prevent offenses by those
who endorse these standards. Most often, self-sanctions occur as the
potential offender considers performing the illegal conduct and, ideally,
such self-generated anticipatory condemnation prevents the offense.6 '
Bandura contends that self-sanctions and social sanctions may prevent
crime more effectively than formal legal punishment and that strict
enforcement of the law through legal punishment may serve to prevent
crime more effectively by confirming the conventional social morality
than by direct deterrent effect.6 2
James Stephen contended not only that the criminal law represents
the public morality, but also that legal punishment expresses the hatred
and resentment that ordinary citizens feel for the criminal. 63 According
to one interpretation of Stephen, he understood this expression of hatred
and contempt accompanying punishment as an aspect of its preventive
role; legal punishment not only expresses the hatred and resentment of
the populace, it also ratifies these sentiments. In'this way, legal pun-
ishment denounces crime and reinforces both the criminal law and the
accepted social morality that corresponds to the core rules of the criminal
law."
Joel Feinberg advanced a later and more refined account of this
expressive function of legal punishment. 65 Feinberg argues that the ex-
61. A. Bandura, supra note 21, at 273-74.
62. Id. at 278-82.
63. J. Stephen, supra note 42, at 148-52.
64. H. Hart, supra note 56, at 60-65.
65. Feinberg, supra note 25, at 95.
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pression of social condemnation is inherent in the concept of legal
punishment. Certain forms of harsh treatment, including those which a
society employs as its primary response to violations of the core rules
of its criminal law, serve as conventional expressions of condemnation.
Imprisonment and execution, for example, are conventional symbols of
condemnation in modern societies. Thus, by sentencing offenders to
these forms of punishment, society articulates and reinforces the social
prohibition of their conduct as contrary to accepted social morality. By
"condemnation," Feinberg means both reprobation-the stern judgment
of disapproval-and resentment-angry or vengeful attitudes.6
If Hart is correct in his contention that the criminal law serves
primarily to provide guidelines for self-regulation and only secondarily
as a means of coercive control, then one should expect this expressive
function of the criminal law to enhance the law's preventive effect in
two different ways. First, it should augment the direct preventive effects
of legal punishment, by making actual punishment more aversive by
subjecting the offender to expressions of social reprobation and resent-
ment and by supporting the general deterrent effect through the threat
of social contempt. One might reasonably suspect, however, that those
who are not dissuaded by the threat of incarceration or execution will
not vest great significance in expressions of social contempt. Perhaps,
therefore, the more significant preventive effect of the expressive function
of punishment lies in the second and indirect mode. To the extent that
criminal punishment expresses the moral judgment and resentment that
represents the shared social morality, it reinforces the social odium
attached to such behavior and promotes the general tendency of the
population to consider such conduct reprehensible. Thus, it encourages
popular endorsement of and allegiance to the social morality represented
by the criminal law and promotes voluntary compliance by the majority
who incorporate this social morality into their personal criteria of ac-
ceptable conduct for themselves.
If the expressive function of legal punishment promotes the pre-
ventive purpose of the criminal law primarily through this indirect mode,
the magnitude of this effect should correlate closely with the corre-
spondence between the criminal law and conventional morality. Close
66. Id. at 95-101. Feinberg recognizes a broader sense of the term "punishment"
that could include sanctions such as fines or license revocations. He employs the term
"penalty" for this broader category of social sanctions in order to distinguish it from
the narrower and more emphatic "punishment." The central contention of Feinberg's
conceptual claim is that the paradigmatic forms of criminal punishment in a particular
society take on a symbolic significance such that punishment through the application of
one of these methods inherently expresses condemnation. In contemporary society, this
set of inherently condemnatory modes of punishment would include execution, corporeal
punishment, and imprisonment.
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correspondence between the popular social morality and the conditions
that support legal punishment should promote identification of criminal
prohibition with immorality and encourage repudiation of crimes and
criminals by the general public. Conversely, loss of this correspondence
weakens the identification of criminal offenses with immorality, under-
mining the personal and informal social sanctions associated with crimes.
If, however, as Feinberg contends, expressed condemnation consti-
tutes part of the concept of legal punishment, then punishment under
the criminal law that fails to correspond with conventional morality
creates an impression of hypocrisy in the criminal justice system because
the courts' actions will express social condemnation in situations that
do not, by the criteria of the widely accepted social morality, deserve
condemnation. Legal punishment under conditions that do not elicit
condemnation in the conventional social morality weakens the popular
association between the criminal law and the accepted social morality.
To the extent that the criminal law and conventional social morality
diverge, members of the society are less likely to attach personal sanctions
on the basis of illegality.
Given the evidence suggesting that personal and informal social
sanctions support the law more effectively than formal legal ones, this
pattern is likely to decrease moral consensus supporting the criminal
law, weakening allegiance to it and decreasing voluntary compliance.
6 7
If this argument is correct, it suggests that criminal punishment under
conditions that do not elicit support from the conventional social morality
might prevent crime through the direct mode of deterrence at the expense
of diluting the correspondence between law and conventional morality,
thus weakening the moral condemnatory force of legal punishment and
decreasing popular identification with the standards represented by the
criminal law. Such a pattern might reduce allegiance to the law and
voluntary compliance with it, producing a net loss in crime prevention
by undermining the indirect preventive effect. Criminalization of alcohol
during prohibition and of marijuana during the 1960-70's arguably dem-
onstrate this pattern of alienation between law and conventional morality
leading to a net loss in compliance with the law.
C. CFE and Indirect Prevention
Execution of disturbed offenders has been condemned as cruel,
brutal, and barbaric throughout history of the Anglo-American criminal
law, and it continues to hold the same status today." Courts have
interpreted this legal consensus as "objective" evidence of contemporary
67. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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standards of decency. 69 If this deeply and broadly established legal
repudiation reflects the moral intuitions of many members of society,
then the CFE requirement may promote the preventive function of legal
punishment by protecting the correspondence between law and conven-
tional morality and, thus, by facilitating the indirect mode of prevention.
Assume for the sake of argument that executing disturbed offenders
would promote, or at least not impair the general deterrent effect of
punishment. Supreme Court cases identify deterrence and retribution as
the legitimate social purposes of capital punishment. 70 Although these
opinions identify deterrence as a legitimate purpose, the analysis pre-
sented above suggests that these courts should be understood as using
"deterrence" in the extended sense and, therefore, as recognizing pre-
vention as a legitimate social purpose of punishment. 71 Even given the
assumption that executing the disturbed offenders would deter, the prac-
tice may not serve a net preventive effect if it dilutes the persuasive
moral force of the criminal law by creating significant divergence between
legal practice and the conventional social morality, thus weakening the
popular tendency to view violations of the criminal law as morally
unacceptable.
If the general population shares the opinion that execution of dis-
turbed offenders constitutes cruel, brutal, and barbaric behavior, then
the practice could cause the law to diverge from conventional morality
so drastically that some would consider certain illegal conduct to be not
only morally acceptable but morally mandatory. Thus, the CFE re-
quirement might undermine the deterrent effect of capital punishment
to some unspecified degree yet serve the preventive function of the
criminal law by avoiding a practice that would promote alienation be-
tween the law and conventional morality.
D. Summary and Conclusions of Part III
When one clarifies the distinction between deterrence and prevention,
understands that prevention, rather than deterrence only, is a legitimate
purpose of capital punishment, recognizes the persuasive moral force of
the criminal law as one indirect source of prevention, and considers the
possible effect on this persuasive moral force of executing disturbed
69. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989) (statutes and court practice
provide objective evidence of evolving standards of decency). The majority of the Court
apparently think that such legal evidence is in some sense more objective and more
indicative of contemporary moral consensus than alternative sources such as surveys of
the populace. While the Court has put forward no persuasive reason to believe this, it
seems reasonable to accept virtually universal legal practice as one source of evidence
regarding conventional social morality.
70. Id. at 2956; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929-30 (1976).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
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offenders, it is at least plausible that the CFE requirement serves the
preventive purpose of legal punishment. This argument provides one
purely consequentialist rationale for maintaining the CFE provision, but
two problematic questions remain.
First, this rationale arises from the fact that the criminal justice
system has historically recognized and continues to endorse the CFE
provisions, and from the inference that this pattern of legal practice
reflects the conventional morality. What principled foundation, however,
can one advance for this practice? Why should the conventional social
morality object to the execution of disturbed offenders as immoral in
light of the assumptions made in part I regarding the justification of
the sentences in these cases? If these institutions reflect moral confusion,
should the law conform to the confusion or attempt to correct it? This
argument provides no moral foundation in deeper principle for the CFE
requirement; rather, it accepts the apparent social consensus and argues
from that empirical claim to the likely practical effects of executing
disturbed offenders despite the apparent consensus. If the social con-
sensus were to change, this argument would no longer support the CFE
requirement. This argument would also lose its force if some further
evidence suggested that the "objective" legal evidence did not accurately
represent conventional morality because, for example, popular opinion
had changed but the law remained behind due to inertia.
Second, this argument is a conditional one in that it rests on the
plausible but not proven premise that the alienating effects of executing
disturbed offenders would outweigh any deterrent effects, producing a
net loss of prevention. This assumption might fail in either of two ways.
The legal prohibition may not accurately reflect the conventional mo-
rality, in which case eliminating the CFE requirement might actually
improve correspondence between the legal system and the accepted social
morality. Alternately, the current law regarding the CFE requirement
might actually reveal the social consensus, but the alienating effects
might not outweigh the direct deterrent effects of executing the disturbed
offenders. If future evidence suggests that either of these conditions
obtains, should the criminal justice system then abolish the CFE re-
quirement, or is there some nonconsequentialist moral reason why the
law ought to retain it regardless of its preventive productivity? Parts
IV and V pursue these issues.
IV. PosMVE JUSTIFICATION: RETmIBuTE
Section II identified three variations of the retributive theory of
punishment that have apparently been contemplated in the literature
regarding the CFE requirement. These interpretations portrayed retri-
bution as primarily concerned with restoring the moral balance, satisfying
the public thirst for vengeance, or assuring punishment in proportion
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to guilt. Section II rejected all three, either as insupportable or as
irrelevant to the CFE requirement. Consider, however, the following
alternative interpretation of the retributive theory.
A. Punishment and Expressed Condemnation
Feinberg defines moral condemnation as the collective social judg-
ment of reprobation combined with an expression of resentful attitude.
The expression of condemnation, according to Feinberg, is part of the
concept of legal punishment. 72 It is difficult, however, to specify the
exact object of these judgments and attitudes.
Consider the possibility that legal punishment expresses condem-
nation only of the specific conduct that constitutes this offense. For
example, suppose that A is convicted of assault and sentenced to six
months in jail for punching B. 73 Perhaps the condemnation is directed
in a very narrow way at the conduct defined as "this punching of B."
In this form it would not imply condemnation of A as an actor or as
a person.
Unfortunately, this interpretation seems to include within the insti-
tution of punishment certain social processes that are usually distin-
guished from punishment precisely because they do not express moral
condemnation in the same manner as punishment. For example, severely
disturbed people who perform dangerous acts may be confined through
civil commitment procedures or through criminal commitment after ac-
quittal pursuant to the insanity defense.7 4 These people, like those subject
to criminal punishment suffer a major deprivation of liberty and social
disapproval of the conduct that served as the predicate for their con-
finement. These commitments are not usually included in the category
of punishment, however, at least partially because they do not carry
the condemnatory significance of criminal conviction.75
72. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
73. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 211.1 (Official Draft and Explan-
atory Notes 1985) [hereinafter Model Penal Code]. The code defines assault as purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily "injury to another".
74. S. Brakel, J. Parry & B. Weiner, supra note 1, at 21-75 (regarding civil com-
mitment) and 725-34 (regarding commitment after insanity defense acquittal).
75. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051-52 (1983).
The Court reasoned that the purpose of commitment following an insanity defense acquittal
is treatment and protection, not punishment. Considerations relevant to punishment,
including retribution, are not relevant to length of confinement. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 427-28, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1810 (1979). The Court distinguished civil commitment
from criminal punishment and required only the clear and convincing standard of proof
for civil commitment partially because the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt
constitutes part of the moral force of the criminal law and should not be extended to
other aspects of law that do not carry the same stigma.
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Consider, for example, a variation of the hypothetical described
above in which A is civilly committed as mentally ill and dangerous to
others after he punches B. A is confined in the state mental hospital
pursuant to a statute which allows the civil commitment of a person
who is mentally ill and dangerous to others as manifested by some
recent violent conduct.7 6 Clearly the commitment communicates disap-
proval of the conduct that precipitated it (reprobation) and it may well
represent resentful attitudes despite the judgment that A does not qualify
for legal punishment. In cases such as this second variation of "A
punching B," the legal response to the conduct expresses condemnation
of that behavior, but does not constitute legal punishment precisely
because it does not express condemnation of the type expressed by legal
punishment.
Perhaps, then, legal punishment communicates condemnation not
only of the act, but also of the actor as a morally reprehensible person
of defective character. 77 This interpretation would distinguish legal pun-
ishment from other processes such as civil commitment which might
direct repudiation and resentment toward the harmful actions of a
severely disturbed person, yet recognize that the actor does not deserve
condemnation. Unfortunately, this interpretation cannot accommodate
other cases. Some offenders live generally meritorious lives until they
succumb to temptation or provocation and commit one relatively minor
offense. Suppose, for example, that A punches B in the nose in response
to insults that mitigate, but do not excuse or justify, A's hitting B.
The court might convict A but give a minimal sentence because this
conduct was an aberration by one who is not vicious or malicious. The
court would select only a minimal sentence because it would conclude
that A is not a reprehensible person, although his act was worthy of
condemnation. Yet, it would be plainly false to claim that his conviction
and minimal sentence was not "really" punishment.
In short, if the condemnation is understood as directed only at the
conduct, then certain social processes such as civil commitment seem to
become erroneously included in the concept of punishment. Similarly,
if the condemnation is understood as directed at the actor's character,
then the concept of punishment does not accommodate some clear cases
of punishment in which a person of generally moral character commits
one offense.
76. See e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.20(l)(a)(2)(b) (West 1987).
77. Admittedly, it is difficult to specify exactly what we mean when we say that an
actor is a morally reprehensible person. We do speak of persons, however, as "bad,"
"wicked," or "evil." We also say of a person that he is a criminal or a felon. In some
sense, therefore, we predicate immorality and criminality as properties of persons as well
as of acts.
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Consider the possibility that the condemnation applies to the action.
That is, the condemnation is directed not at merely "this punching of
B," nor is it directed at A as a person generally deserving denunciation.
Rather, it is directed at "A's punching of B." On this interpretation,
the punishment condemns A for punching B, expressing disapproval of
A's deciding to punch B. One might think of it as a limited scope
variation of the prior person-centered interpretation. According to this
understanding, punishment expresses the message that society disapproves
of A's punching B and attributes this objectionable action to some fault
in A's character, but it does not necessarily condemn A as a person of
generally reprehensible character.
Unfortunately, this account is conceptually deficient when applied
to the conscientious civil disobeyer who intentionally violates the law
for what she takes to be an overriding moral purpose. A jury might
conclude that she acted with moral but not legal justification, or it
might deny that her act was morally justified while having no doubt
that she was genuinely convinced that her act was not only morally
justified, but morally required. When the court concludes that this
offender clearly violated the law with no legal defense, it might convict
her but administer the minimum sentence. By doing so, the court would
acknowledge the legal offense but it might also be expressing moral
admiration for the actor's fortitude in disregarding her self-interest and
performing the act that she understood was morally required. Particularly
in the former variation, in which the jury concludes that the defendant
acted with moral but not legal justification, it might also be expressing
admiration of her doing the act. Yet, it seems clear that this is a case
of legal punishment.
In summary, Feinberg contends that the concept of legal punishment
includes the expression of moral condemnation, but it is extremely
difficult to specify the precise nature or object of this condemnation.
The examples described above rule out the conduct, the actor, and the
actor's performing the act as inadequate descriptions of the object of
the condemnation. While these factors would appear to be the most
promising candidates, the following interpretation of retribution and its
significance for the expressive function of punishment provides an al-
ternative explication.
B. Persons and the Right to be Punished
Morris defines the "core rules" of the criminal law as those which
prohibit violence and deception, and he argues that general compliance
with these rules benefits all persons. He contends that this core of the
criminal law promotes a fair balance of social benefits and burdens and
that criminals take an unfair advantage by refusing to carry the burden
of restraint regarding some socially unacceptable act. Morris justifies
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the institution of punishment, therefore, as the social mechanism designed
to rectify this unfair situation created by the crime. By punishing crim-
inals, society deprives them of the unfair advantage they took, dis-
courages others from doing so in the future, and reassures most members
of society that they can conform to the criminal law without placing
themselves at an unfair advantage. 7
Morris also contrasts institutions that encourage compliance through
punishment with those that guide behavior through involuntarily ad-
ministered therapy. He argues that institutions of punishment, unlike
therapeutic ones, are rule-based systems that respect the individual's
ability to choose behavior through a process of reasoned decision-making.
Morris contends that respect for persons requires this respect for the
ability to choose for reasons, and further, that persons have a right to
be treated as persons. He concludes, therefore, that persons who commit
crimes have a right to be punished rather than subjected to involuntary
therapy because punishment respects their status as persons who chose
for reasons.
79
Two difficulties with Morris's account are apparent. First, Morris
justifies institutions of criminal law and punishment as maintaining fair
distributions of benefits and burdens. Most societies maintain institutions
of punishment, however, and some of these appear to be justifiable.
Yet, it is not clear that the social distribution of benefits and burdens
is fair, even when one limits the analysis to the benefits and burdens
of the criminal law. For example, all citizens accept the burden of
foregoing resort to force in order to receive the benefit of being safe
from assault. The 250 pound uneducated person with below average
intelligence who carries this burden foregoes a major part of his potential
capacity to influence others, however, while the 120 pound educated
person with above average intelligence foregoes very little of his potential
capacity to influence. Similarly, the individual born into a wealthy family
receives considerable protection and gives up little by the mutual re-
pudiation of theft, while the individual born into the poor family gets
little protection and is deprived of one potential source of wealth and
capital with which she could improve her position.
Second, this "right" to be punished is an unusual type of right.
Most commonly, legal rights identify areas of personal control within
which the right-holder has some authority to exercise some degree of
sovereignty. 8° The right to be punished, however, does not provide the
78. H. Morris, supra note 58, at 33-36.
79. Id. at 36-50.
80. Black's Law Dictionary 1189-90 (5th ed. 1979). The concept of a right is a highly
controversial one that has drawn voluminous attention from legal scholars and philosophers.
The point of this objection is not that one could not have a right to be punished; it is,
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holder a license to do anything, to choose, or to exercise sovereignty
in any area of life; it is a right to have something done to the holder
by others. When the right attaches, the holders have no authority to
waive it or to decide how, where, or when they will exercise it. Others
administer the holders' rights according to some legal procedures con-
trolled by those other parties.
Theories of punishment address issues about punishment as a social
institution and as an individual event. As a social institution, punishment
consists of a set of rules, practices, and roles such as a modern criminal
justice system. An individual event of punishment is an application of
that social institution to a particular person on a particular occasion.
Questions about the concept, efficacy, or justification of punishment
can involve either level of organization." Regarding the justification of
punishment, for example, one can ask whether the current criminal
justice system constitutes a justified system of punishment, whether the
practice of capital punishment is justified, or whether a particular of-
fender ought to be punished.
Although Morris presents his argument regarding the fair distribution
of burdens and benefits and his argument for the right to be punished
as parts of an integrated theory of punishment, one can understand
these two arguments as addressing two related but separate issues. The
first is society's justification for maintaining an institution of punish-
ment, while the second concerns the limits within which society may
coercively guide behavior in any particular case. The first difficulty,
regarding the imbalance of social benefits and burdens, questions the
claim that social institutions of punishment can be justified by the fair
distribution of benefits and burdens that they supposedly create.
One might consistently reject this justification for the institution of
punishment, however, while maintaining that persons have a right to
be punished rather than subjected to therapy. The negative aspect of
this right merits special emphasis. While the right to be punished appears
at first glance to be a right that few would fight for, Morris articulates
this right as "the right to be punished rather than treated if he is guilty
of some offense." 82 When articulated in this manner, the right is pri-
marily a negative right to be free of coercive therapy or treatment, and
it is grounded in the individual's right to be respected as a person who
makes choices for reasons. The claim, then, is that if the state is to
rather, that the unusual nature and role of this alleged right should lead one to examine
closely the broader theory of which it is a part in order to understand the justification
for the contention that punishment is most accurately interpreted in terms of the punished
offenders' rights.
81. Baler, Is Punishment Retributive?, 16 Analysis 25-32 (1955); H. Hart, supra note
9, at 1-13.
82. H. Morris, supra note 58, at 45.
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exercise coercive power over the individual as a result of that individual's
having committed an offense, it must do so according to a system of
rules that respects that persons capacity to act on reasoned choice.
To fully understand Morris's position, one must understand him as
claiming that institutions of punishment are justified when they can
reasonably be expected to promote a fair balance of benefits and burdens
or, perhaps, when they appear to be more likely than alternative insti-
tutions to promote such a balance. On either of these interpretations,
however, Morris does not contend that promoting the fair balance
adequately justifies specific applications of the institution to individual
offenders. Rather, individual instances of punishment are justified by
the fact that the offender committed an offense under conditions that
render him guilty and, therefore, vulnerable to behavior-guiding pro-
cedures that respect the person's capacity to act for reasons. Punishment
justified in this manner pursues the preventive purpose of punishment
while maintaining respect for persons and protecting and promoting
Hart's choosing system. 83
Regardless of the fairness of the social structure, that structure may
be designed with a system of punishment that respects the person's
capacity to act for reasons: a patently unfair system in terms of the
distribution of substantive benefits and burdens could employ a system
of punishment that directs the behavior of persons in a manner that
respects their ability to choose for reasons. Such a system would con-
stitute a system of punishment although it may not be justifiable as an
institution or in application.
On this interpretation of Morris, respect for persons as agents who
are capable of reasoned choice grounds the right to be punished rather
than treated when guilt for an offense justifies the state in exercising
some coercive force over the individual. This emphasis on respect for
persons as being capable of acting on reason reveals the Kantian foun-
dation of Morris's theory. Kant argued that only rational beings have
the ability to direct their behavior through the idea of law; that is, on
rational principle." Kant contended that only the rational being acting
on the good will-on principles of impartial reason-constitutes the
preeminent good known as the moral good. 5 He argued that only
morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, has dignity. 6
83. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 48-49, 182-83.
84. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 80, 95 (H.J. Patton trans.
1964).
85. Id. at 69.
86. Id. at 102. Kantian theory is controversial, both in its interpretation and in its
application. This paper does not purport to present an authoritative interpretation or
defense of Kant's moral theory. The point is only to illustrate the Kantian roots of
Morris's theory of punishment.
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In short, Kant contended that only the rational person exercising the
capacity to choose actions on the basis of reasoned principle qualifies
as good in itself and as a source of dignity. He concluded that this
conception of a person and of the moral good in itself grounds a duty
of respect for persons.87
Morris advances a theory of punishment that emphasizes the state's
duty to respect persons as beings capable of directing their behavior
through the exercise of rational choice. This theory reflects Kantian
roots, and Kant is often identified as the classic retributivist. The var-
iations of retributivism discussed in conjunction with the CFE require-
ment were all inadequate for the task of justifying that provision.
Perhaps, however, a retributive theory that emphasizes the central role
of respect for persons would provide a more satisfactory rationale.
C. Retributive Punishment and Respect for Persons
Morris advanced a theory of punishment in which societies maintain
institutions of punishment to guide behavior in a manner consistent with
a fair distribution of benefits and burdens, but he advocated a system
of excuses for those who do not violate the rules voluntarily because
they do not take unfair advantage.18 He provided no reason, however,
to assume that the individual who violates the law due to ignorance,
mental disorder, or duress does not create an unfair distribution of
benefits and burdens. If A punches B in the nose due to reasonable
mistake or insanity, for example, A may still gain some unfair advantage
from that act. Certainly, B's broken nose is neither less a burden nor
more fair by reason of A's mental disorder. Morris has apparently
conflated the fairness of the distribution of the benefits and burdens
with the issue of A's blameworthiness for causing that distribution.
Morris' argument from a fair distribution of burdens and benefits
advances a justification for the social institution of punishment, but
concerns regarding voluntariness and blameworthiness address the sep-
arate question regarding the justification for applying that social insti-
tution of punishment to this particular offender. Hart limits the justified
application of punishment to particular individuals by requiring that the
person has knowingly and voluntarily committed an offense. He argues
that distribution of punishment to individuals on the basis of the re-
tributive principles of guilt and desert restricts justified punishment to
those who have violated the law despite a fair opportunity to conform
and protects the nature of society as a choosing system for persons who
direct their lives through the exercise of rational choice.89
87. Id. at 95-96.
88. H. Morris, supra note 58, at 35.
89. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 22-24, 44-49.
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By limiting punishment to knowing and voluntary offenders,. Hart,
like Morris, recognizes respect for persons as beings who direct their
lives through the exercise of rational choice as a consideration that limits
how society can legitimately direct the conduct of its members. Hart
and Morris both identify the rule-based system of punishment as a
method of behavior guidance uniquely appropriate to rational choosers,
and for this reason, Hart contends that only rational agents who vol-
untarily violate the law can be justifiably punished, while Morris argues
that punishment is the only legitimate form of coercive state behavior
guidance for rational agents. Hart explains his theory as one that applies
the retributive principles of guilt and desert in order to maintain a
choosing system for those with the ability to direct their actions through
the exercise of rational choice. Similarly, Morris presents his theory as
grounded in respect for persons with the capacity for rational choice
and advocates excuses for those who do not deserve punishment because
they did not violate the law voluntarily.90
Both Hart and Morris advance retributive theories insofar as they
emphasize the backward looking principles of guilt and desert as jus-
tification for punishing voluntary violations by persons with the capacity
to direct their lives through rational choice. Neither, however, presents
his retributive theory as intended to pursue a moral balance or to satisfy
the public thirst for revenge. Rather, both identify respect for persons
as agents who are capable of directing their lives through rational choice
as the core of their retributive theories. Retributivism, on this view,
displays its Kantian roots in that it rests on a foundation of respect
for persons as beings capable of directing their actions through the
exercise of reason. 9'
Both Hart and Morris acknowledge the preventive purpose of legal
punishment. Hart contends that society classifies certain kinds of be-
90. H. Morris, supra note 58, at 35.
91. Hart has advanced an analysis of the concept of responsibility in which he has
clarified four different senses of the term "responsibility." Capacity-responsibility and
liability-responsibility are central to this discussion. People are legally responsible for their
actions when they perform that conduct under conditions that render them liable to legal
consequences. Hart terms responsibility in this sense "liability-responsibility." Foremost
among the conditions that render people responsible in this sense for their behavior are
certain psychological capacities including understanding, reasoning, and the ability to
control conduct. Hart identifies this set of capacities as "capacity-responsibility," he
contends that capacity-responsibility is usually a necessary condition for liability-respon-
sibility. That is, actors must be responsible agents (capacity-responsibility) in order to be
held responsible (liability-responsibility). H. Hart, supra note 9, at 215-22, 227-30.
The term "responsible" will be used throughout this paper in the sense in which it
means capacity-responsibility unless a different sense is specified. The terms "responsible
person (or agent)," "rational person (or agent)," and "rational chooser" will all be used
interchangeably to refer to people who possess the capacities that constitute capacity-
responsibility.
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havior as criminal offenses to prevent their occurrence, while Morris
recognizes the role of punishment in enforcing the core rules of the
criminal law in order to maintain the fair balance of burdens and
benefits. 92 Their systems also pursue a retributive purpose, however, in
that they recognize the importance of maintaining a choosing system
that maximizes respect for persons as rational agents as an additional
aim of the criminal justice system. This second purpose requires the
application of the backward looking retributive principles in the distri-
bution of punishment. Thus, this purpose limits the manner in which
the state can justifiably pursue the preventive goal. On the conception
of retribution advanced here, retributive theories of punishment vest
fundamental value in the person as a responsible agent acting on reason.
Retributive institutions of punishment, therefore, express respect for
responsible agents and constitute part of a social structure that enables
people to function as rational agents.
This view of the criminal justice system as a social behavior guiding
mechanism designed to prevent offenses but also intended to maintain
a choosing system that respects persons through the application of
retributive principles is consistent with contemporary American law.
Current penal codes define offenses according to a structure of offense
elements including the requirement of a voluntary act and a culpability
element. 9a Additional defenses exculpate defendants who satisfy the of-
fense definitions under conditions that prevented them from voluntarily
directing their conduct as agents capable of rational choice.94 Finally,
civil commitment statutes limit confinement for protection and invol-
untary therapy to those who suffer some major mental illness that
prevents them from directing their lives through rational choice.95 These
statutes serve both to exclude responsible agents from coercive therapy
92. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 6; H. Morris, supra note 58, at 33-36.
93. Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 2.01, 2.02. The code provides for a
limited set of strict liability violations which do not include culpability elements in their
definitions. These violations are not crimes as defined by the code, however, and defendants
convicted of these violations cannot receive sentences of imprisonment or probation. The
code construes these violations as regulatory and it limits penalties to fines. The code
allows strict liability offenses under these conditions because "the condemnatory aspect
of the criminal conviction or of a correctional sentence is explicitly precluded." Id. at §
2.05 and comments at 281-83. Thus, the strict liability offenses contemplated by the code
fall well outside the scope of the core rules of criminal law addressed by Morris. See
supra text accompanying note 77. In addition, the penalties involved are not those which
inherently express condemnation. See supra text accompanying note 64.
94. Id. at § 4.01 (insanity), 2.09 (duress); P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses §§
25(a), 161(a) (2) (1984). These excuses exculpate defendants who performed offenses under
conditions such that they were not responsible (liability-responsibility) for their conduct.
95. S. Brakel, J. Parry.& B. Weiner, supra note 1, at 24-25. The claim here is that
the legal institutions are designed in this manner, not that they always function according
to design.
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and to provide an alternative method of behavior control for those who
are not rational agents, thus preserving the criminal justice system as
uniquely applicable to those who qualify as responsible persons.
In summary, Morris, Hart, and contemporary American law suggest
a theory of punishment that is preventive insofar as one of the primary
purposes of the criminal justice system is the prevention of crime. A
criminal justice system based on this theory is also retributive in that
it limits punishment to those who fulfill the retributive requirements of
guilt and desert. Furthermore, such a criminal justice system constitutes
a "choosing system" designed to promote respect for responsible persons
by providing a behavior guiding institution that is uniquely appropriate
to individuals with the abilities to comprehend rules, to apply those
rules prospectively to their circumstances and their potential courses of
action, and to decide through the exercise of reason either to conform
to those rules or to violate them. Criminal justice systems based on this
theory provide social institutions of legal punishment !hat pursue both
preventive and retributive purposes. The next section reexamines the
nature and scope of the moral condemnation inherent in legal punishment
within such a retributive institution.
D. Condemnation in a Retributive Institution of Punishment
Feinberg argued that moral condemnation constitutes part of the
concept of legal punishment in that expressions of condemnation are
inherent in the primary methods of legal punishment such as execution
and imprisonment. The precise nature and scope of this moral condem-
nation, however, are difficult to specify. Condemnation of the act, of
the actor; and of the actor's performing the act, all fail to provide fully
adequate accounts.96
The criminal justice system consists of a complex set of rules and
practices that constitutes the legal institution of punishment. Within that
system, the substantive criminal law defines offenses and the appropriate
punishments.Y The nature of law requires that offense definitions take
the form of relatively broad act-types as opposed to specific act-tokens. 9
96. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
97. See, e.g, Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 210-51 (offenses), art. 6 (sentences).
98. A. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action 10-15 (1970). Act-types are general
descriptions of certain act-properties that humans can exemplify at a particular time and
place. For example, raising one's hand, standing up, and asking a question are all act-
types. Act-tokens are specific instantiations of those types by a particular actor at a
particular time. For example, Smith's raising his hand at a particular time is a token of
the act-type defined as "raising one's hand." Similarly, Smith's punching Jones in the
nose at a particular time is a token of the act-type defined by the Model Penal Code's
definition of assault as "purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another." Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 211.1(l)(a).
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The principle of legality mandates that "conduct is not criminal unless
forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such conduct is
criminal." 99 Fuller describes a set of requirements that he contends are
necessary to establish a system as a system of law. He advances a list
of characteristics including generality, constancy of the law through time,
and congruence between official action and declared rule, and he argues
that these principles of legality constitute a formal "inner morality of
law" that must be satisfied in order to qualify a system as a system
of law.1°° Hart denies that these properties constitute a morality of law,
but agrees that such characteristics are necessary for an effective legal
system.101
All of these sources support the contention that a legal system must
define offenses as general act-types that identify proscribed conduct
before offensive behavior occurs and allow relatively consistent appli-
cation across time and circumstances. These properties enable the law
to serve its purpose as a set of rules that people can use prospectively
to direct their behavior so as to avoid violating the law and subjecting
themselves to punishment. In addition, these properties of law partially
justify the institution of punishment because law with these properties
provides those who are subject to its sanctions with notice and an
opportunity to conform. Indeed, a statute defining a particular act-token
that had already occurred as a crime would usually be invalid in the
United States as an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder.' 2
While it is reasonable to expect the majority of act-tokens that fall
within the scope of offenses defined as act-types to take a form antic-
ipated by law-makers, a few will probably occur in unforeseen circum-
stances that alter the social desirability of the conduct or the culpability
of the actor. A legal system can provide some fine-tuning with principles
of justification, mitigation, and aggravation that enable the judicial
system to adjust verdicts or sentences in some of these unusual cases.
Any system that remains general enough to be considered a system of
law, however, will have to deal with relatively coarse categories of act-
types.
For these reasons, the criminal law must define offense elements in
terms of relatively broad act-types that will encompass a wide range of
particular circumstances. This requirement that the law define criminal
offenses as relatively broad act-types contributes to the difficulties en-
countered in clarifying the nature and scope of the condemnation inherent
99. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 3.1
100. L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-94 (revised ed. 1969).
101. H. Hart, supra note 59, at 61, 202.
102. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 2.4(a) (ex post facto laws), 2.4(d)
(bills of attainder).
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in legal punishment. A person commits criminal mischief, for example,
when she "damages tangible property of another purposely, recklessly,
or by negligence.'1 3 If the offender purposely destroys property worth
more than five thousand dollars, her criminal mischief constitutes a
felony punishable by imprisonment. 1 4 By defining criminal mischief as
an offense punishable by incarceration, a mode of punishment that
expresses condemnation,0 5 the criminal justice system expresses condem-
nation of conduct of this type.
The criminal justice system, however, does not define offenses that
warrant condemnation purely in terms of overt conduct. By defining
offenses in terms of culpability elements and voluntarily acts in addition
to overt conduct or results, the institution of punishment directs con-
demnation only toward proscribed act-types performed with certain men-
tal states. Suppose, for example, that a driver destroys a ten thousand
dollar car belonging to another when he swerves to avoid a child who
darts in front of his car. The driver was driving carefully, but the child
appeared from between two parked cars, requiring the driver to swerve
without any opportunity to realize that doing so would result in his
colliding with a parked car across the street. The criminal mischief
statute does not apply to this act-token because it is not a token of
the proscribed type which includes the requirement of certain mental
states. Thus, the statute does not direct condemnation toward this driver,
his act, or acts of this type because it limits its scope to damage caused
purposely, recklessly, or negligently.'0 In addition, certain excuses, such
as insanity or duress exclude additional actors from the proscribed
punishment and condemnation. °7
Although the precise purpose of the culpability and voluntary act
requirements and of the insanity and duress defenses may continue to
engender substantial debate, they serve roughly to limit criminal liability
to conduct that can be attributed to the defendant as a product of his
rational choice. By including these provisions in the criminal code, the
institution of punishment directs condemnation only toward defendants
who perform proscribed act-types as agents who direct their actions
through rational choice. Thus, it promotes the retributive purpose of
the system as one uniquely appropriate to rational agents, and it meets
the retributive justificatory requirement by punishing only those who
voluntarily and knowingly violate the law. In short, social institutions
of punishment similar to the contemporary American system define
103. Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 220.3(l)(a).
104. Id. at § 220.3(2), 6.06(3).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 regarding modes of punishment that
inherently express condemnation.
106. Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 2.02.
107. Id. at § 4.01 (insanity), 2.09 (duress).
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offenses and defenses to express condemnation at the systemic level
toward proscribed act-types performed by agents with the capacities to
direct their conduct through rational choice.10
While the institution of punishment expresses condemnation at this
systemic level by virtue of the manner in which it defines offenses,
individual applications of this institution occur at the level of specific
events. At this level, particular instances of punishment express con-
demnation toward specific act-tokens and possibly toward the identified
individuals who have been convicted of these offenses. The troublesome
examples encountered in section IV(A) involved specific act-tokens. As
long as the legal system retains a degree of generality sufficient to
preclude its adjusting to the unique circumstances of every conceivable
act-token, the moral quality of some possible act-tokens will differ from
the moral quality of the act-types that constitute the offense definitions
of which they are a token. When these discrepancies occur, the particular
act-token may not merit the condemnation that the institution expresses
on the systemic level toward the act-type. These discrepancies will occur
when the moral quality of the act-token in question is significantly
affected by some property of that act-token which the relatively coarse-
grained act-types and justificatory, mitigating, and aggravating principles
of the legal system fail to recognize.
Suppose that a conscientious civil disobeyer unsuccessfully attempts
to legally prevent a local movie theater from showing sadistic forms of
child-pornography. Assume that many people, including this defendant,
believed that these films promote violence toward children, but that the
films are technically within the legal limits. When the defendant found
herself without legal alternatives, she broke into the theater and destroyed
the screen and projectors to prevent further screenings. She made no
effort to escape arrest and at trial she raised a defense of justification
in the form of the lesser evils or necessity defense. 1°9 She was unable,
however, to show that her act was necessary to prevent a greater harm.
Although she believed that her action was necessary to prevent increased
violence to children, she realized that she had no actual evidence to
108. This analysis applies to a criminal justice system that conforms roughly to the
Model Penal Code which incorporates certain retributive elements. It is at least logically
possible that a criminal justice system could exclude such elements and adopt a system
of strict liability for physical movement that caused certain results. Such a system would
express condemnation in a different manner that will be described infra at note 112 and
accompanying text.
109. Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 3.02; P. Robinson, supra note 94, at §
124. Defendants raise the necessity or lesser evils defense when they contend that they
performed conduct that would ordinarily violate the law under conditions such that it
was necessary to perform that conduct in order to prevent some greater harm to a legally
protected interest.
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support this belief. Although some jurisdictions provide the necessity
defense to those who believe or reasonably believe that their act is
necessary to avoid greater harm, other jurisdictions, including this one,
allow the defense only when the act is in fact necessary. 10
Those who agree with her belief regarding the harmful effects of
the films might think that her action was morally justified or even
obligatory. Those who do not share her beliefs about these effects but
acknowledge that she honestly held them might hold that she was morally
blameless, although mistaken. Suppose that the judge and jury fall into
these two categories of people, but that, given the lack of any legal
defense, the jury feels compelled to convict the defendant. The judge
sentences her to one year in prison but suspends the sentence on the
condition that she make restitution for the damage. At first glance, this
case appears to create a contradiction because the court both morally
condemns the defendant for her action (because criminal conviction and
punishment are inherently condemnatory) and it does not (because the
judge and jury think that her behavior was morally justified or at least
that she was blameless for it). Some might suggest that this action by
the court expresses legal but not moral condemnation. This option is
not available, however, to one who accepts Feinberg's contention that
legal punishment inherently expresses moral condemnation.
This apparent contradiction is illusory, however, and one can un-
derstand why it is illusory when one disentangles the analysis of the
event at the systemic level from the analysis at the level of application.
At the systemic level, the substantive criminal law identifies acts of this
type as offenses that merit punishment including the inherent condem-
nation. By convicting the defendant, the jury ratifies the law's general
condemnation of acts of this category at the abstract level of the
institution of punishment. In effect, the jury endorses the proposition
that the criminal law ought to condemn the act-type defined roughly
as legally unjustified destruction of another's property by a person with
the capacity to direct her action through rational choice.
While the judge and the jury agreed that this defendant's action
exemplified this proscribed act-type, they believed either that this par-
ticular token of the act-type was one that did not merit condemnation
due to morally relevant features that do not carry justificatory force
within the legal system, or that the defendant was not blameworthy due
to her honest belief that the conduct was morally required. Hence, the
110. Compare Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 3.02 with P. Robinson, supra
note 94, at § 124. On this hypothetical, she would have the defense available in jurisdictions
that require only that the defendant believe the act is necessary, but she would not have
it available in jurisdictions that require a reasonable belief because she realized that she
had no actual evidence to support her belief.
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jury's guilty verdict expressed condemnation of the act-type at the sys-
temic level, although the jurors did not consider the defendant, her act,
or both appropriate for condemnation at the level of the individual act-
token. The legal system provides no official mechanism through which
the jury can express differential evaluations at the systemic and applied
levels. In this case, however, the judge expressed the systemic condem-
nation by handing down the jail sentence and communicated the lack
of condemnation at the applied level by suspending the sentence.
In cases such as this one, the jurors condemn the act-type that this
act-token exemplifies, but either they do not condemn this particular
act-token if they think it was morally justified or they do not condemn
this actor for performing this act-token if they think that the defendant
was blameless, although the act was not morally justified. The standard
legal procedure, however, does not allow the jury to express these
differential evaluations, and one cannot even articulate them clearly
unless one separates the analysis into the systemic and applied levels.
The usual system of justifications and excuses does not address these
cases. The defendant can escape punishment and condemnation for this
particular act-token by raising a defense of justification if the conduct
was morally justifiable for reasons that the legal system recognizes as
legal justifications. Alternately, the court can exculpate the defendant
through an excuse such as insanity if she performed the proscribed
conduct under conditions such that she was not capable of directing
her conduct through rational choice. Finally, the court can reduce the
sentence through mitigation when the defendant committed the offense
under circumstances that reduce but do not eliminate culpability.
The criminal law makes no provision, however, for cases in which
a fully responsible individual performs conduct that exemplifies a pro-
scribed act-type under circumstances that render it morally meritorious,
or at least inappropriate for moral condemnation, by virtue of properties
that do not carry justificatory force within the legal system. These cases
occur, however, because any action constituting an offense will token
more than one act-type. Thus, a single act might token both a type
that instantiates an offense definition and a different type that carries
moral but not legal significance. The act of civil disobedience described
above, for example, constitutes a token of the type defined by the
definition of criminal mischief, but it also tokens the types defined as
"actions intended to protect children" or "actions motivated by con-
science." Cases such as this one reflect the fact that people often attribute
substantial moral weight to subtle issues of motivation, but motive affects
legal guilt only insofar as it addresses some specific offense element or
recognized legal defense."'
111. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 3.6.
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Judges and juries who encounter circumstances of this type are likely
to experience a tension between their moral evaluation of this particular
situation and their endorsement of the systemic condemnation of this
general category of acts. They may address this tension by convicting
the defendant but minimizing the sentence in order to express only
symbolic condemnation of the act-type, or they may sacrifice the systemic
condemnation to their specific evaluations of this case through a response
such as a jury nullification. ' 12
On this interpretation, the condemnation that Feinberg contends is
inherent in the concept of legal punishment occurs at the relatively
abstract systemic level. The criminal justice system expresses condem-
nation of certain act-types when it proscribes them as offenses and
prescribes punishments such as imprisonment or death. It is theoretically
possible to create a criminal justice system that defines offenses purely
in terms of conduct or results without regard to culpability elements or
voluntary act requirements. The penal code in this system might define
criminal mischief, for example, as "damaging tangible property belonging
to another" without mention of culpability elements included in the
contemporary American version of the offense.' Presumably, this code
would pursue only preventive purposes and it would express condem-
nation toward proscribed act-types on the systemic level as well as any
tokens of those types on the applied level.
The contemporary American criminal justice system, in contrast,
pursues both preventive and retributive purposes. ' 4 A retributive system
promotes respect for persons as beings who can direct their action
through rational choice by defining offense elements and excuses in a
manner that limits punishment, and thus condemnation, to offenses
performed under conditions that warrant attribution of these offenses
to responsible agents. That is, a retributive system proscribes certain
act-types and subjects them to moral condemnation by prescribing in-
herently condemnatory punishment, but it defines the offense elements
and defenses in such a way as to limit condemnation for act-tokens of
those types to those performed by persons who are capable of directing
their action through rational choice." ' By doing so, it establishes the
112. The phrase "jury nullification" refer's to the jury's power to find the defendant
not guilty regardless of the legal instructions they receive from the judge and the evidence
presented. In this manner, the jury can address the discrepancy they perceive between
legal rules and their own moral standards by refusing to apply the law as they are
instructed. For a brief account of jury nullification and a list of further sources, see R.C.
Singer & M.R. Gardner, Crimes and Punishment 41-44 (1989).
113. Compare this hypothetical statute with the Model Penal Code's definition of
criminal mischief, supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 87-94 for an account of a retributive system
in the sense discussed here.
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criminal justice system as a behavior-guiding institution uniquely ap-
propriate to responsible agents and it grounds the foundation of that
institution in respect for persons as the only type of agents appropriately
subject to the requirements and condemnation of such an institution.
A retributive institution of punishment condemns act-types at the
systemic level by catagorizing them as offenses and prescribing inherently
condemnatory punishement. Individual applications of punishment to
particular offenders for specific act-tokens express condemnation of three
different types. First, they confirm the systemic condemnation of the
act-type of which this particular offense is a token. Presumably, con-
demnation at the systemic level would have little significance if courts
routinely refused to confirm it by convicting defendants who had per-
formed tokens of that type. Second, they condemn the particular act-
tokens committed by the defendant at trial in each case. Third, they
express condemnation of the defendants as persons with the capacities
for rational choice who elected to violate the law under conditions that
render them accountable.
Ideally, all four aspects of condemnation will converge in most
cases. Consider, for example, an ordinary case of unjustified assault on
B by an angry but responsible A. At the systemic level, the institution
condemned assault as a general category of conduct by identifying it
as a punishable offense. In this specific case, most jurors would pre-
sumably endorse that general condemnation of assault as an unacceptable
type of behavior, and they would also condemn this act-token as an
instance of that type. Finally, they would express condemnation toward
A as a responsible agent who violated this prohibition without justifi-
cation.
Problematic cases arise, however, when one or more of several
potential types of divergence occur. First, the system may prohibit certain
categories of behavior as offenses when jurors in general do not condemn
that type of behavior. When the conventional morality embodied by the
criminal law diverges substantially from the conventional morality of
the general population, the law may lose its morally persuasive force
and, thus, poorly serve its primary function of guiding the voluntary
behavior of the majority. Arguably, this pattern of divergence occurred
during the prohibition period in the United States.
The second pattern of divergence occurs when jurors endorse the
general categories of offenses defined by the criminal law but encounter
specific cases that they do not consider deserving of condemnation
because they think that the act was morally justified in that case. If
for example, A punched B in response to constant insults by B, many
jurors might think that B deserved what he got and that A's punching
B was morally justified, although the provocation would legally constitute
mitigation rather than justification." 6 The civil disobeyer described above
116. Black's Law Dictionary 903-04 (5th ed. 1979); Model Penal Code, supra note
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would fall into this category for those jurors who thought that her
particular act of destruction was morally justified. This pattern of di-
vergence occurs because certain circumstances may have moral justifi-
catory force in the eyes of jurors, although the legal system does not
recognize that force. As suggested previously, the requirement of gen-
erality in the legal system may render some divergence of this sort
practically, if not logically, unavoidable.'1 7
The third pattern of divergence strikes to the heart of a retributive
system of law; it occurs when the defendant meets the legal criteria of
accountability but the jurors do not consider this defendant blameworthy.
In the ordinary case, such as the unprovoked assault of B by A, the
guilty verdict and the application of punishment express condemnation
of A both as a responsible agent who has violated the law and as
morally blameworthy for the offense. Under certain conditions, however,
the jury may believe that the defendant violated a law as a responsible
agent but that this offender is not morally blameworthy.
Certain cases of civil disobedience fall into this category.' Assume,
for example, that the jurors in the civil disobedience case described
above endorse the law against criminal mischief and agree with the
prosecution that this particular act was both morally and legally un-
justified. In addition, they believe that the defendant acted as a fully
responsible person with unimpaired capacity for rational choice but also
that she acted out of the honest conviction that her act was morally
required. In cases like this one, the jurors might want to condemn the
defendant as one who violated the law while accountable by legal criteria,
while refusing to condemn her as morally blameworthy.
The ordinary case actually involves condemnation of the actor in
two senses; conviction condemns the defendant both as a responsible
agent who is accountable by the criteria of the system and as morally
blameworthy. In certain cases, however, such as some instances of civil
disobedience, the defendant may warrant condemnation in the first sense,
but not in the second. These cases arise when the jurors conclude that
the defendant is not morally blameworthy for reasons that do not carry
exculpatory force in the criminal justice system. A retributive institution
of punishment promotes respect for persons by limiting application of
the institution to those who are responsible agents, and therefore, it
limits punishment to those who merit condemnation in the first sense.
Jurors may hold, however, that some of these defendants do not deserve
condemnation in the second sense because they are not blameworthy
for reasons that lack legal recognition.
Ordinarily, of course, neither jurors or officials distinguish these
various types of condemnation expressed by punishment, and the system
73, at § 7.01, 7.03, 7.04. The code provides a list of factors for judges to consider when
selecting the appropriate sentence from a statutory sentence range.
117. See supra notes 98-101 regarding the principle of legality.
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does not provide formal procedures for expressing condemnation in one
sense while withholding it in another. Consequently, officials and jurors
struggle with the moral tension in the difficult cases in which the various
senses do not converge. Given the demands for generality and relative
simplicity in the legal system, it may not be possible to fully rectify
this tension.
In a retributive system of punishment, then, the condemnation iden-
tified by Feinberg as inherent in the concept of legal punishment must
occur at two levels. First, the criminal justice system necessarily expresses
condemnation at the systemic level when it identifies an act-type as an
offense punishable by one of the core methods of criminal punishment
such as imprisonment. Second, by convicting the defendant, the court
necessarily condemns the actor as a responsible agent who violated the
law under the criteria of the legal system. The first level of condemnation
condemns some particular type of conduct as contrary to the social
morality embodied in the criminal justice system, while the second level
condemns the actor for violating the criminal law under conditions of
accountability as a person with the capacity to select actions through
rational choice.
At first glance, this account appears to assert a logically necessary
connection between law and morality that challenges the separation thesis
regarding the relationship between law and morality defended by legal
positivists such as Hart."' This account of the condemnation inherent
in legal punishment does assert a conceptual connection between legal
punishment and the social morality embodied in the criminal law. At
the systemic level, any institution of legal punishment necessarily con-
demns the act-types it identifies as punishable offenses. A retributive
system of punishment also necessarily condemns each convicted offender
as a responsible agent who has violated the law under conditions that
meet the institution's criteria of accountability. On the most plausible
reading of Hart, however, this conceptual connection does not undermine
the separation thesis.
Hart's separation thesis rejects the necessary connection between law
and morality that he attributes to natural law theory. Natural law theory,
as Hart understands it, asserts a relationship between law and morality
such that a legal rule constitutes valid law only if it conforms to correct
moral principles." 9 The positivist separation thesis denies this alleged
connection. 20
While the separation thesis denies that there is a logically necessary
connection between legal validity and correct moral principles, this paper
118. H. Hart, supra note 59, at 181-207.
119. Id. at 151-53, 181-82.
120. Id. at 181-82.
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advances an account of the moral condemnation inherent in legal pun-
ishment that asserts a conceptual connection between legal punishment
and the conventional morality embodied in the criminal law. That is,
Hart denies any logically necessary connection between law and critical
morality, while this account asserts a logically necessary connection
between legal punishment and conventional morality.12'
Feinberg argued that moral condemnation is inherent in the concept
of legal punishment.'2 This paper explicates this conceptual connection
as one that binds legal punishment to the conventional morality embodied
in the criminal law. One could reject any particular criminal justice
system as inconsistent with critical morality, while acknowledging that
the necessary connection between legal punishment and morality asserted
in this paper obtains in that system.
Jurors or officials, therefore, can express moral condemnation of
defendants and their acts in the sense required by this explication without
believing that either the defendants or their actions deserve condemnation
according to the moral criteria that these jurors or officials personally
endorse.
Most effective criminal justice systems will probably achieve general
correspondence between condemnation at the systemic level of act-types
and the popular moral evaluation of act-tokens as well as between
systemic standards of accountability and popular criteria of blamewor-
thiness. If these judgments often diverge, than either the system must
change to accommodate ordinary moral notions, or the criminal law
will begin to lose its persuasive moral force because the majority of
citizens will not endorse the standards embodied in the criminal law as
guidelines for their voluntary compliance. Notice, however, that diver-
gence will undermine the persuasive moral force of the criminal law
regardless of the critical supportability of the system; the effectiveness
of the system depends on convergence of conventional morality at the
systemic and popular levels, not on the critical correctness of the system.
A system of criminal law may retain substantial persuasive moral force
if it accurately represents the popular conventional morality even if it
is morally abhorrent from a critical perspective.
In summary, the retributive theory of punishment found in Morris,
Hart, and contemporary American criminal law promotes respect for
persons as agents capable of directing their behavior through rational
choice. On this account, retributive institutions of punishment limit legal
punishment to offenders who have violated the criminal law under
conditions that support attribution of the offense to the offender as a
responsible agent. These institutions express moral condemnation at the
121. See supra note 56 for the distinction between critical and conventional morality.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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systemic level when they identify certain act-types as punishable offenses.
Specific applications of these institutions condemn offenders as respon-
sible agents who have committed offenses under conditions of account-
ability by the criteria of the system. When the conventional morality
represented by the criminal justice system corresponds to that of the
jurors, conviction also expresses their condemnation of the act-type
proscribed by the offense definition, the act-token performed by the
defendant in this case, and the offender as morally blameworthy for
committing a wrongful act.
V. THE CFE REQUIREMENT IN A RETRIBUTIVE
INSTITUTION OF PUNISHMENT
A. Rationale
People are competent when they are "duly qualified," "having
sufficient ability or authority"; they must be "able," "capable."' '2 In
the criminal law, competency to stand trial requires the abilities to
understand the nafure of the proceedings and to communicate with the
defense attorney.124 In the civil law, competency to contract requires the
ability to understand the nature of the agreement and, in some juris-
dictions, the ability to act reasonably with regard to the contract 2 To
make competent decisions regarding health care, the patient must have
the ability to understand the health care procedure in question, its likely
benefits and side-effects, and the available alternatives. In addition, one
must be able to reason effectively enough to deliberate about the choice
in light of one's values and to communicate the decision.' 26
For each of these legal purposes, competence is relative to the task
at hand; people are competent for a particular purpose if they possess
the capacities needed to perform the required task under the circum-
stances. 27 Competence to contract involves the ability to understand
because a valid contract requires mutual assent by the parties to be
bound by the contract. 28 Competence to stand trial involves the ability
to understand and communicate because the defendant must make im-
portant decisions during the trial and assist the defense attorney in
123. Black's Law Dictionary 257 (5th ed. 1979); This legal definition is consistent with
the meaning of the term in ordinary language. Oxford English Dictionary 719 (compact
ed. 1977).
124. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 4.4(a).
125. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 8-10 (3d ed. 1987).
126. Buchanan & Brock, Deciding For Others, 64 The Milbank Quarterly 17, 24-26
(supp. 2, 1986).
127. Id. at 22-24.
128. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 125, at §§ 2-1 to 2-4.
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presenting the defense. 2 9 In each case, the standard of competency
reflects the task that the party must perform.
Proposed standards of competency to face execution sometimes re-
flect the task that the underlying rationale attributes to the condemned
offender. If one thinks that the offender must assist the attorney in
raising appeals or motions for clemency, then one might devise a standard
similar to that applied to competency to stand trial. A standard designed
to assure that the offender had the ability to make peace with God
would probably require the ability to understand the nature of the
forthcoming execution and its relationship to prior bad deeds. 30 These
rationales, however, have been rejected in section II.
While the core of the concept of competency involves the person's
ability to make the decision or perform the task required, the condemned
prisoner, in contrast to the individual who enters into a contract or
stands trial, does not have to decide or do anything. It seems natural
to view the CE requirement, along with competency to enter a plea,
to stand trial, to waive rights, and to face sentencing, as one step in
a series of determinations regarding competency to proceed. 3' The ap-
propriate rationale, for competency to face execution remain elusive,
however, because the CFE requirement simply has nothing to do with
the offender's competence in this ordinary sense in which competence
is relative to the task at hand. Competency involves the person's capacity
to decide or act, yet execution does not require the offender to make
any decision or perform any act. Hence, no issue regarding the offender's
competence arises. The executioner, rather than the offender, must act.
The claim that the offender lacks competency to face execution
challenges the justification of the executioner's action. To articulate the
appropriate rationales and standard regarding the CFE requirement,
therefore, one must look to the theory of punishment supporting the
criminal justice system. In a retributive system of punishment such as
the contemporary American criminal justice system, punishment must
reflect the personal culpability of the offender. 132 Execution stands as
society's extreme penalty, not only in the sense that it has the most
severe practical effect on the offender, but also because it represents
the most extreme expression of moral outrage at particularly offensive
129. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 4.4(a).
130. Ward, supra note 1, at 101-07. Ward provides a list of the state standards. Many
provide no clear standard at all, describing the offender who is not competent to face
execution as "insane."
131. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 18-19, 70 S. Ct. 457, 461-62 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 34-35 (1736)),
W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 4.4.
132. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947-52 (1989); Tison v, Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 149, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
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conduct.' A retributive institution of punishment must justify not only
the general practice of capital punishment, but also the execution of
this particular defendant with its inherent expression of extreme con-
demnation. 134
Given the assumptions required to raise the CFE question as a viable
issue, the offender must have performed the offense under conditions
of full culpability, justifying the initial death sentence.' Although sen-
tencing and execution are separate aspects of a complex social response
to criminal conduct, each constitutes an application of the social insti-
tution of punishment to the defendant, and each carries the symbolic
significance of an expression of condemnation of the defendant's offense
and of the offender as a responsible agent who is fully accountable for
violating the criminal law. By hypothesis, the offender qualified as a
responsible person who was appropriately subject to the criminal justice
system at the time of sentencing. When the time for execution arrives,
however, the severely disturbed offender fails to qualify as the type of
rational and accountable agent to whom the retributive institution of
punishment uniquely applies. The actual execution constitutes an addi-
tional emphatic denunciation both of the offender's offense and of the
offender as an accountable agent who is subject to the moral condem-
nation of the retributive institution of punishment. 3 6 To execute this
offender now is to apply the retributive institution of punishment to
this person now and, thus, to include this person in the community of
rational agents to whom this institution is uniquely appropriate.
Some condemned offenders, however, are not accountable rational
agents. To apply an institution uniquely applicable to responsible agents
to one who is not responsible is to misapply that institution in a manner
that distorts both the significance and the underlying justification of a
retributive institution of punishment and undermines one aspect of its
expressive function. Execution within a retributive system of punishment
condemns the offender as a responsible rational agent who has committed
a capital offense under conditions of full accountability and who qualifies
as an appropriate subject of the retributive institution at the time of
the execution. When the offender is not in fact a responsible person,
the execution undermines the moral force that the retributive institution
derives from its status as an institution exclusively applicable to rational
agents. By executing such individuals, the criminal justice system aban-
dons its role as the institution that expresses respect for human dignity
133. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976).
134. Feinberg, supra note 25, at 118.
135. See supra text accompanying note 7.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111-17 regarding the two types of condemnation
inherent in criminal punishment by a retributive institution.
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by constituting a special social structure applicable only to those who
possess the capacities of responsible persons. 13 7
If the argument in section III is correct, the consequentialist and
retributive theories of punishment converge on this issue, but they remain
independent arguments that reflect their foundations in different types
of moral theories. According to the consequentialist argument in section
III, executing a severely disturbed offender would dilute the allegiance
that many responsible agents might feel toward the criminal justice system
as an institution uniquely applicable to them and particularly binding
on them. This effect might reasonably be expected to decrease voluntary
compliance with the system, leading to an increase in crime. This ar-
gument employs empirical premises regarding both the correspondence
between the widespread legal recognition of the CFE requirement and
conventional morality and the possible effects of executing disturbed
offenders upon voluntary compliance with the criminal law. Evidence
contrary to these premises would undermine the consequentialist argu-
ment.
The retributive argument, in contrast, does not appeal to any an-
ticipated untoward social consequences of executing disturbed offenders.
A retributive institution of punishment demands a stay of execution for
one who does not qualify as a responsible agent because to execute such
a person would distort the significance of retributive punishment and
would undermine the moral foundations of the institution. While the
moral theory underlying the consequentialist argument vests primary
value in the positive social effects of any particular practice, the cor-
responding theory supporting the retributive argument values the dignity
of the responsible person and of social structures that express respect
for such persons, regardless of the consequences.
137. This rationale would apply in principle to other forms of punishment in the
narrow, emphatic sense. See supra note 65. Indeed, the Model Penal Code provides for
removal of severely disturbed prisoners from prisons to mental health facilities. See supra
note 73, at § 303.3(2)-(4). While the rationale applies in principle, the issue is not likely
to arise often in practice because neither the disturbed offender nor the attorney has
comparable motivation to raise it. Avoiding execution is a matter of major significance
to most residents of death row, but many disturbed offenders may vest little importance
in securing a transfer from one locked state institution to another. In addition, the
continued imprisonment of a disturbed offender carries much less symbolic significance
than an execution does because the former involves no change in the status quo while
the latter constitutes an additional and emphatic exercise of state power over the offender.
For these reasons, in addition to the practical difficulties involved in finding secure
treatment facilities, the issue of continued imprisonment of disturbed offenders carries
less practical and symbolic impact. In principle, however, the rationale advanced here
would apply to imprisonment as well as to execution because both constitute paradigmatic
forms of criminal punishment that have taken on expressive significance as appropriate
social responses to violations of the core rules of the criminal law. It would also apply
to corporeal punishment for the same reasons.
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Executing disturbed offenders would undermine this moral foun-
dation and denigrate the unique stature of the community of responsible
persons by designating the criminal justice system as an institution
uniquely appropriate to such persons but then extending it to those who
lack the capacity to participate fully in that system. Such executions
would dilute both the unique status of rational agents and their special
responsibility to direct their actions in a manner consistent with the
capacities of responsible persons.
B. The Standard
According to the account described above, a retributive institution
of punishment refuses to execute condemned prisoners who fail to qualify
as rational agents because these offenders do not fall within the scope
of the institution's authority as defined by its purpose and moral jus-
tification. The CFE provision actually addresses the justification of the
execution and the offender's status as a responsible agent who is ap-
propriately subject to the condemnation expressed by the execution rather
than the offender's competence to make any decision or perform any
action relevant to the execution.
To formulate an adequate standard for this purpose, consider two
related provisions of the criminal law that also address the psychological
condition of the individual who is subject to the legal process. Some
courts and commentators have interpreted the CFE requirement and
proposed standards of competency by analogy to the provision requiring
competency to stand trial.'38 Competency to stand trial requires the
ability to understand and communicate because the task at hand involves
decision-making and assisting the attorney. CFE differs from competency
in the strict sense of the word precisely because the condemned offender
has no decisions to make and no task to perform.
Criminal liability attaches to an individual for past acts. It is back-
ward-looking in the sense that it applies only to defendants who have
committed crimes voluntarily, with the required mental state, and without
excuse. 3 9 The CFE requirement differs from standards of criminal li-
ability in that it addresses the offender's condition at the time of
execution, and it arises as an issue only if the individual has already
been identified as criminally liable regarding some past act.
While each of these provisions evaluates the defendant's capacities
regarding some specified past act or future function, the CFE requirement
addresses the offender's current status as an accountable agent who is
a proper subject of the retributive institution of punishment. People are
138. See supra section II B.
139. Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 2.01, comments at 216.
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accountable if they are "liable to be called to account, or to answer
for responsibilities and conduct."' 4 To account for one's behavior is
"to answer for discharge of duty or conduct; to give a satisfactory
reason for.' 4' Thus, in order to be accountable in a retributive system
of punishment that is designed to apply exclusively to rational agents,
the offenders must have the capacities required to answer for their
conduct in the manner required by that institution; that is, as rational
agents. A retributive institution of punishment that calls upon unqualified
agents for an accounting within the system undermines its own purpose
as a system that respects responsible persons.
Thus, in a retributive institution of punishment, criteria of account-
ability serves as eligibility requirements that qualify agents as proper
subjects of the institution. People are eligible for a particular role or
status if they are fit to be chosen for it, and they are fit if they possess
the necessary qualifications. 42 Eligibility critera set the minimal quali-
fications necessary for inclusion in the identified population. 43 Adequate
accountability criterion for a retributive institution, therefore, should
specify the minimal qualifications necessary to render one admissible as
a rational agent.
The standards applied to criminal liability and competency to stand
trial each constitute accountability criteria for persons who are to be
subject to some particular aspect of the retributive institution of pun-
ishment. The standard of competency to stand trial identifies those who
are eligible to participate in the criminal trial in the role of defendant,
and standards of liability identify those who are eligible to participate
in the social system as one who is liable for offenses. To identify the
eligibility criteria for inclusion in the class of people appropriately ad-
dressed by the retributive institution of punishment, consider the stan-
dards for competency to stand trial and criminal liability, and abstract
the common core of these provisions from the specific features that
address the separate purposes of each.
Consider first, standards of criminal liability. Hart contends that
actors are legally responsible for their acts or harms when the connection
between the actors and their actions, or the harm caused by those
actions, is legally sufficient to render them subject to liability. Hart
identifies responsibility in this sense as "legal liability-responsibility."
He argues that there are several criteria for legal liability-responsibility,
the most prominent of which are psychological capacities that the actor
must possess.'" Hart labels this set of psychological capacities "capacity-
140. Oxford English Dictionary 65 (compact ed. 1977).
141. Id. at 64.
142. Id. at 89, 265.
143. J. Feinberg, supra note 25, at 57.
144. H. Hart, supra note 9, at 215-22.
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responsibility" and he includes in this set the abilities "to understand
what conduct legal rules or morality require, to deliberate and reach
decisions concerning these requirements, and to conform to decisions
when made.' 14
Contemporary American criminal law includes a very similar set of
requirements regarding mental elements in offenses. The culpability el-
ements in offense definitions define the required degree of awareness
with which the offender must act for his action to constitute that
offense.1' 6 The voluntary act provision requires the necessary connection
between the actor's physical motion and the decision to act. 147 Finally,
the insanity defense precludes guilt when the actor falls to satisfy certain
cognitive and perhaps volitional criteria.'"
Competency to stand trial requires the capacity to understand the
proceedings and communicate with one's attorney 49 While the capacity
to reason or to deliberate are not explicitly stated, the rationale implies
that these are also necessary at least to some minimal degree. Competency
is required of defendants because they must make important decisions
during the trial and assist their attorneys in presenting their defense. 50
The ability to reason and to deliberate among alternatives is usually
considered a necessary aspect of decision-making competence. 5' Hence,
the foundation of the competency requirement implies some minimal
capacity in these areas. A defendant could not be said to understand
his options, such as those involved in entering a plea or raising a defense,
if he could not reason from the decision made to the likely results.
Certain aspects of the criteria for criminal liability and competence
reflect the specific purposes of each provision. The voluntary act re-
quirement and the volitional clause in some insanity defenses address
the actors' ability to direct their actions through unimpaired volitional
processes because these provisions are concerned with the actors' liability
for certain past actions. The precise meaning of these volitional re-
quirements and the nature of the processes they contemplate remains
controversial. The intuitive idea behind them, however, is relatively well
accepted: people should be held liable for their actions only if they had
the ability to direct their behavior. Cases in which this capacity is clearly
absent, such as those involving seizure or convulsion, are widely accepted
145. Id. at 227.
146. Model Penal Code, supra note 73, at § 2.02.
147. Id. at § 2.01.
148. Id. at § 4.01. The code's provision for nonresponsibility due to mental disorder
includes both cognitive and volitional clauses. Other insanity defense statutes, however,
do not include volitional disorders.
149. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 1, at § 4.4(a).
150. Id.
151. Buchanan & Brock, supra note 126, at 25-26.
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as nonculpable.'5 2 The competency to stand trial standard, in contrast,
does not include volitional components, but it does require the ability
to communicate. This difference reflects the specific purpose of each
provision-the competency to stand trial standard addresses the defen-
dants' capacity to decide and communicate in the present rather than
their liability for past acts.
Both standards require the ability to understand, however, and both
require the capacity to reason. In addition, both standards imply a
requirement of unimpaired consciousness. Consciousness involves the
individual's state of alertness and awareness of himself, his environment,
and the relation between the two.'53 Gross impairment of consciousness,
such as that which occurs in a coma, deprives the person of any data
regarding external or internal events or circumstances. People who suffer,
for example, from seizures or head injuries sometimes experience clouded
consciousness in which their awareness of their environment and of their
place in it is limited or distorted. 5 4 Minimally adequate awareness con-
stitutes a prerequisite for effective understanding and reasoning. Hence,
any defendant who suffered a severe disturbance of consciousness Would
probably fail to meet the understanding or reasoning criteria at least in
the sense that they would be unable to effectively employ those capacities.
Actors with adequate consciousness, understanding, and reasoning
have the ability to comprehend rules, circumstances, behavioral alter-
natives, the likely results of those behaviors, and the various relationships
among these factors. These basic cognitive capacities form the common
content of the criminal liability and competence standards. These ca-
pabilities represent the minimal elements required to qualify a person
as a rational agent and, thus, an appropriate subject of the retributive
institution of punishment. Those who possess these capabilities qualify
for inclusion in the population to whom such an institution applies. 55
Although precise thresholds are difficult or even impossible to specify,
those who suffer severe disturbance of these cognitive processes fail to
meet this criteria. Severely disorganized psychotics and the severely re-
tarded, for example, would fall short of the threshold.
Recall that retributive institutions of punishment embody a moral
theory that vests fundamental value in the person as a moral agent
152. I add "generally" to this claim because there are cases such as those in which
a person causes harm by driving when they are forewarned that they are vulnerable to
seizures that constitute exceptions to this principle. The claim here is only that this is a
widely accepted intuitive idea that permeates the law. This paper makes no attempt to
develop a satisfactory formulation of the principle that supports this common intuition.
153. Blair, The Medicolegal Aspects of Automatism, 17 Med. Sci. & Law 167 (1977).
154. Id.; L.C. Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry 115-16 (8th ed. 1973).
155. The minimally adequate degree of these capacities may vary with the social
conditions, the specific purposes, the complexity of the legal requirements, the underlying
moral theory, or other relevant variables.
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acting on reason. Retributive institutions express respect for such persons
by providing a social structure that is uniquely appropriate to them and
within which they can exercise their capacities as self-directing rational
agents. 156 Such an institution cannot extend its mandate and sanctions
to those who fail to qualify as rational agents without undermining its
own justification and purpose as a social structure designed to reinforce
the unique status and responsibility of rational persons. To fulfill this
role, a retributive institution of punishment would apply a standard of
eligibility for execution similar to the following one.
The state may not execute a condemned offender if at the time
of the scheduled execution, that offender suffers severe distur-
bances of the cognitive capacities of consciousness, comprehen-
sion, or reasoning.
VI. SUMMARY
This paper examines the putative rationales for the CE requirement
and argues that all of the usual candidates fail to justify the provision.
It then advances consequentialist and retributive alternatives to the usual
rationales, and contends that these arguments successfully support the
CFE requirement. On this account, however, the traditional formulations
misconstrue the nature and purpose of the provision. In short, com-
petence to face execution has nothing to do with the offender's com-
petence as that term is usually interpreted. The requirement is best
understood as reflecting minimal eligibility requirements for inclusion in
the population of responsible persons who are appropriately held subject
to a retributive criminal justice system.
In addition to addressing the CFE requirement, this analysis clarifies
two broader underlying jurisprudential issues that permeate many areas
of the criminal law. First, it advances an interpretation of the retributive
principles that support the contemporary American criminal justice sys-
tem. Second, it advances an analysis of the moral condemnation that
some have contended constitutes an inherent aspect of legal punishment.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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